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Chapter 1  
 
Introduction 
 
 Background 
Japan and its government are facing a growing number of various challenges that require 
innovative and flexible responses. The population is expected to further decrease while inbound 
tourists are rapidly growing. The industrial and economic structure is changing towards a more 
service-oriented economy. Unprecedented levels of disasters are occurring one after another. 
However, the government of Japan (GOJ) organizations are known for its unique culture called 
“Kasumigaseki Culture”, which is not sufficient ground for innovative and flexible responses 
to unprecedented challenges. 
This dissertation studies the responses of GOJ organizations to external requirements and 
expectations from the perspectives of organizational culture and absorptive capacity. It focuses 
mainly on two contrasting cases, in which ministries of the GOJ responded to: (i) the 
unprecedented challenge of transporting radioactive soil and waste to the Fukushima Interim 
Storage Facility (ISF) after the Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami on 11 March 2011 
and (ii) the application of an international good practice, road safety audits (RSAs), which 
almost all major countries but Japan had adopted. The government organizations were required 
to react innovatively and flexibly in those cases although the GOJ organizations in general do 
not have organizational cultures that promote innovation. This dissertation identifies the key 
factors that led two GOJ ministries, namely the Ministry of the Environment (MOE) and the 
Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism (MLIT), to innovative responses with 
consideration to their organizational culture and absorptive capacity and identify the enabling 
2 
 
factors for organizations like the GOJ to react more flexibly and innovatively to external 
requirements and expectations. Some other cases from each ministry were also examined to 
provide further observations on their organizational behaviors. 
The GOJ emphasized in its innovation polity (Cabinet Office, 2007) that innovation is 
growingly important as Japan and the world are entering an era that human beings have never 
experienced before and that creation of enabling environment which supports the ambitious 
and challenging efforts of individuals is needed. 
Culture is an important factor in organizational analysis (Smircich, 1983). Culture can be 
studied as an integral part of the adaptation process of organizations, and specific cultural traits 
may be useful predictors of performance and effectiveness (Denison & Mishra, 1995). Douglas 
and Wildavsky (1983) developed the four prototypical cultural types using two central 
dimensions of sociality: grid and group. It is assumed that individual human behavior and 
collective cultures can be categorized by two independent elements: grid and group dimensions. 
The grid dimension describes how different people are in the group and how they take on 
different roles. People have distinct roles and positions within the group with specialization 
and different degrees of entitlement under strong grid cultures, while people are relatively 
homogeneous in weak grid cultures. On the other hand, the group dimension describes how 
strongly people are bonded together. Under strong group cultures, people have a connected 
sense of identity, relating more deeply and personally to one another. Cultural types can be 
categorized into four quadrants based on the strength of the grid and group dimensions: (i) 
collectivism/hierarchy, (ii) fatalism, (iii) individualism, and (iv) egalitarianism, as Figure 1.1.  
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Source: Author, based on Douglas and Wildavsky (1983), Rippl (2002), and Nishio (2003) 
Figure 1.1: Typology of Culture Using the Grid/Group-Dimension 
 
In the egalitarianism culture, for example, people have high interest and high identification 
regarding group relations (strong group dimension), but they dislike social relations that are 
shaped by social differences or hierarchic structures (weak grid dimension). Diagonally 
opposed groups show differences on both dimensions (grid and group), while neighboring 
groups show similarities on one dimension but differences on the other (Rippl, 2002). 
Organizational culture fosters or inhibits innovation. Naranjo-Valencia, Jiménez-Jiménez, and 
Sanz-Valle (2011) found that organizational culture was a clear determinant of innovation 
strategy; adhocracy cultures foster innovation, whereas hierarchical cultures promote imitation. 
Each organization has a different culture, and Chatman and Jehn (1994) found that stable 
organizational culture dimensions existed across industries and that these culture dimensions 
varied more across industries than within them. The public sector and transport industry, 
characterized by long-linked technologies and low growth, were typically found to be detail 
and stability oriented rather than people and innovation oriented. 
(weak) 
Grid 
(strong) 
(strong) (weak) 
Collectivism/Hierarchy 
Control:  oversight 
Weakness: overreliance to 
authority 
Group 
Fatalism 
Control:  contrived randomness 
Weakness: weak planning, 
passiveness 
Individualism 
Control:  competition 
Weakness: weak cooperation, 
corruption 
Egalitarianism 
Control:  mutuality 
Weakness: indecisiveness 
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The organizational culture of the GOJ is often referred to as unique “Kasumigaseki culture,” 1 
which cannot be seen in other countries. Nishio (2003) pointed out that Kasumigaseki culture 
has all four characteristics defined in Figure 1.1 as below: 
(i) Collectivism/hierarchy: centralized authority, tradition of high respect for 
bureaucracy, and seniority; 
(ii) Egalitarianism: the ringi system,2 close coordination among politicians, private 
sector, and bureaucrats, administrative directives, office rooms with many staff; 
(iii) Individualism: competitive entrance examinations, competition for promotions; 
and 
(iv) Fatalism: frequent personnel transfer of career bureaucrats, samurai spirits of 
bureaucrats. 
Despite all these aspects, Nishio (2003) concluded that organizational culture of the GOJ is 
dominated by egalitarianism and mutuality. As a result, that the authorities often fail to function 
and remain indecisive in situations where decisions and actions are needed. This culture has 
little individualism, where innovative ideas spring out through individual choice and 
responsibility regardless of the social grids; rather, it can be characterized by closedness, 
privileges, sectionalism, centralization-fusion, and mutuality. Nishio (2003) points out from 
the civil-service reform perspectives that “competition of ideas” should be promoted through 
individualism and the surrounding culture that allows such individualism. In this regard, it can 
be hypothesized that weakening of the group dimension while maintaining/enhancing the weak 
grid dimension will enhance innovative and flexible responses of egalitarianism cultures like 
the GOJ’s. 
Shin (2014) compared the administrative cultures in three East Asian countries (Japan, Korea, 
and China) and concluded that the strong legal sense and order/class consciousness in Japan’s 
administrative culture were unique. Suzuki (2008) noted that the inefficiency and inflexibility 
                                                     
1  It is named after the location of the central government headquarters (Kasumigaseki, Tokyo). 
2  Ringi refers to a unique Japanese decision-making system, where a memorandum is prepared by a person in 
charge and brought about for signing off by all the relevant sections and managers with red stamps/seals.   
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of Kasumigaseki bureaucracy had developed to minimize organizational risks associated with 
the potential for the ministry organizations to be headed by incapable ministers (politicians). 
Absorptive capacity is the ability of an organization to recognize the value of new, external 
information and was introduced by Cohen and Levinthal (1990). It is critical to an 
organization’s innovative capabilities and is largely a function of the organization’s level of 
prior related knowledge. Zahra and George (2002) distinguished between an organization’s 
potential and realized capacity and outlined the conditions when the potential and realized 
capacities can differently influence the creation and sustenance of its competitive advantage. 
Ishizuka (2005) focused on absorptive capacity through organizational gatekeeping of 
incoming information and concluded that numerous individuals should be exposed to absorb 
external information directly, instead of gatekeeping by a small number of individuals. This 
was observed to be of particular importance in a rapidly changing or highly uncertain 
environment.  
The concepts of absorptive capacity and organizational culture are closely interlinked. Lane 
and Lubatkin (1998) found that one of the key absorptive capacity factors in inter-
organizational learning lies in the level of management formalization. Higher levels of 
innovativeness in organizational cultures that emphasize learning, development, and 
participative decision-making are associated with a greater capacity for adaptation or 
absorptive capacity (Hurley & Hult, 1998). In the information technology industry, Harrington 
and Guimaraes (2005) found that organizational culture influences absorptive capacity as it 
relates to the implementation of new technologies. 
Despite growing use of the concept, the study of absorptive capacity remains difficult because 
of the ambiguity and diversity of its definitions, components, antecedents, and outcomes (Zahra 
& George, 2002). Volberda, Foss, and Lyles (2010) mapped the existing terrain of research in 
absorptive capacity through a bibliometric analysis. They pointed out that organizational 
design and individual-level factors had been relatively neglected in the absorptive capacity 
research and that more research was required to show how such micro- and macro-level factors 
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would influence organizational outcomes such as competitive advantage, innovation, and 
performance. 
Applying the concept of absorptive capacity to the assessment of the performance of public 
sector organizations has value through theorizing the relationships between organizational 
performance and knowledge processes and the broader concept of dynamic capabilities 
(Harvey, Skelcher, Spencer, Jas, & Walshe, 2010). Existing studies in the field of 
organizational change capacity focus mainly on the private sector and tend to neglect 
organizations in the public sector. Klarner, Probst, and Soparnot (2008) attempted to fill this 
gap through their studies on the organizational change capacity of the World Health 
Organization and found that the organization had been lacking important determinants of its 
change capacity. 
 Objective and Significance 
Typical GOJ’s organizational culture, or Kasumigaseki culture, is known to have a strong 
group dimension (Figure 1.1) and is a difficult ground for innovative and flexible responses to 
non-routine external requirements and expectations although innovative and flexible responses 
are in growing needs as called for in the GOJ’s innovation policy (Cabinet Office, 2007). The 
objective of this dissertation is to identify the factors that can contribute to innovative and 
flexible responses of the GOJ to non-routine external requirements especially from the 
perspectives of organizational culture and absorptive capacity. Policy implications of such 
factors will also be presented. 
Although clear and typical cultural traits exist across the GOJ organizations, each organization 
and its subgroups have different cultures. For example, the MLIT can be assumed to have 
weaker traits of individualism culture than the MOE as Chatman and Jehn (1994) pointed out 
that organizations with long-linked technology and low-growth are typically found to be less 
people and innovation oriented. Cultures and absorptive capacities also vary across sections 
within a ministry as well, and enabling factors for innovative and flexible responses should be 
studied through individual cases. As cultural and absorptive capacity studies on the public-
sector organizations had been lacking (Klarner, Probst, and Soparnot, 2008), this dissertation 
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attempts to identify some factors from concrete cases under the unique GOJ culture to fill the 
gap and discuss policy implications from the cases. 
The dissertation reviews six cases, where organizational cultures and absorptive capacities 
were found to play some key roles, and identifies factors contributing to innovative and flexible 
responses in relation to the GOJ’s unique organizational culture and absorptive capacity. Based 
on the literature review, it is assumed that the following are working hypotheses for the 
contributing factors. 
(i) Weakening of the group and grid dimensions towards individualism (Figure 
1.1) contributes to innovative and flexible responses under the GOJ’s unique 
organizational culture. 
(ii) A full utilization of realized and potential absorptive capacity within 
organizations contributes to the effectiveness of organizational responses. 
(iii) Use of external capacity contributes to building up expertise that lacks within 
the organizations. Use of external experts also contributes to changes of the 
organizational culture. 
The cases are all in the public sector, an area which lacks past studies. Building upon these case 
studies, the dissertation assesses the enabling factors for innovative and flexible responses from 
the perspectives of organizational culture and absorptive capacity, and provides policy 
recommendations to GOJ organizations. 
 Methodology 
This dissertation reviews mainly two contrasting cases in the transport sector in which the GOJ 
organizations responded to external requirements and expectations. Other cases in which the 
MOE and the MLIT responded to external requirements and expectations are also reviewed 
(Table 1.1). In all these situations, the ministries were required or expected to respond 
innovatively and flexibly to meet new or emerging needs. Organizational culture and 
absorptive capacity play important roles when organizations need to change their normal ways 
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of business. Such organizational factors are examined through the case studies, and 
contributing factors are identified.  
Examination of the case studies are based on qualitative analyses of the facts obtained through 
interviews and dialogues the author conducted with relevant government officials and 
stakeholders as well as the hands-on experience of the author. The working hypotheses in the 
previous section are tested through abductive reasoning in the case studies. The best possible 
explanations for the observed innovative or flexible responses of the GOJ organizations are 
derived to identify contributing factors of each case based on literature survey, interviews, 
dialogues, and other means. 
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Table 1.1: Case Studies 
 Ministry of the Environment 
Ministry of Land, 
Infrastructure, Transport 
and Tourism 
Organizational 
characteristics and 
history 
Relatively small, but rapidly 
expanding ministry. 
Established as the Environment 
Agency in 1971; upgraded to a 
ministry in 1999. 
Traditional, long-standing 
organization with a large 
volume of administrative 
mandates and reporting sub-
organizations. 
Former Ministry of Transport, 
Ministry of Construction, 
Hokkaido Development 
Agency, and National Land 
Agency were merged into 
single ministry in 2001. Japan 
Tourism Agency was 
established within the ministry 
in 2008. 
Study cases  1. Transport of radioactive soil 
and waste to the Fukushima 
Interim Storage Facility 
2. Adoption of road safety 
audits, an international 
good practice 
3. Formulation of the Basic 
Environment Law 
4. Formulation of the 
Innovation Promotion 
Outline 
5. Establishment of the 
Carbon Tax and other 
responses to climate change 
issues 
6. Reforms of national airport 
management through 
establishment of the Airport 
Management Reform 
Promotion Office 
Source: Author. 
 Structure of Dissertation 
This dissertation comprises four chapters. This chapter introduces the research background, 
objective, methodology, and structure of the dissertation. 
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Chapter 2 provides the analysis of the MOE through three cases: (i) planning and 
implementation of the transport of radioactive soil and waste to the Fukushima ISF, (ii) 
formulation of the Basic Environment Law, which captured emerging environmental issues 
and provided various breakthroughs in environmental policy, and (iii) establishment of the 
Carbon Tax and responses to various climate change issues. The GOJ had assigned the MOE 
to respond to the unprecedented challenge of transporting radioactive soil and waste to the 
Fukushima ISF. Despite some concerns about its suitability and capacity, the MOE prepared 
transport plans and started a pilot transport project in a relatively short period. This first MOE 
case study includes a review of the factors responsible for the successful planning and 
implementation from the organizational culture and absorptive capacity perspectives. 
Chapter 3 provides the analysis of the MLIT through three cases: (i) application of RSA, which 
is considered as an international good practice and has been adopted by many developed and 
developing countries, (ii) formulation of the Innovation Promotion Outline, and (iii) reform of 
national airports through establishment of the Airport Management Reform Promotion Office. 
The GOJ promotes RSA through bilateral and multilateral overseas development assistance but 
has not applied it to domestic road projects. The first MLIT case study reviews a pilot project 
in Chiba Prefecture and an ensuing nation-wide pilot program from the organizational culture 
and absorptive capacity perspectives. 
Chapter 4 presents the research conclusions and provides policy recommendations. 
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Chapter 2  
 
Transport of Radioactive Soil and Waste to the 
Fukushima Interim Storage Facility and Other 
Experiences by the Ministry of the Environment 
 
The focus of this chapter is the case of the planning and implementation of the transport of 
radioactive soil and waste to the Fukushima Interim Storage Facility (ISF) by the Japanese 
Ministry of the Environment (MOE). The transport commenced in March 2015 following the 
decontamination works from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Station disaster in March 
2011. Although it was an unprecedented challenge and seemed a poor fit for a ministry with 
mainly regulatory functions, the MOE prepared the transport plan and smoothly conducted the 
initial implementation. This chapter reviews the planning and initial implementation processes 
mainly from the organizational arrangement perspectives. Other experiences of the MOE are 
also reviewed, namely formulation of the Basic Environment Law and responses to various 
climate change issues including establishment of the Carbon Tax. 
 Introduction 
This section reviews the planning and initial implementation processes for the transporting of 
radioactive soil and waste generated in the large contaminated areas off-site of the Fukushima 
Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Station in Fukushima Prefecture, Japan, due to the Great East Japan 
Earthquake and Tsunami on 11 March 2011. Such a transport was unprecedented in Japan and 
for the government of Japan (GOJ) in terms of its large quantity (up to 28 million m3) and the 
radioactive nature of the transported substance. Nuclear fuels, high-level waste, and low-level 
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waste are transported from nuclear power stations to treatment plants in special transport 
packaging, but this is mainly by sea and in smaller volumes than the soil and waste from the 
decontamination works. For example, the major transporter of nuclear fuels and wastes in Japan, 
Nuclear Fuel Transport Co., Ltd., transported 23,000 drum cans (about 0.2 m3 each) of low-
level waste and 288 canisters (about 0.17 m3 each) of high-level waste in the peak years. In 
contrast, the MOE expects the transport of up to 6 million m3 of decontamination soil and waste 
to be transported in a peak year. As the volume is large and the transport routes pass through 
populated areas, every action of the MOE has drawn high public concerns and media attention. 
This dissertation attempts to identify the factors that contributed to the smooth planning and 
initial implementation focusing mainly on aspects of administrative arrangement such as 
original experience, expertise, as well as the absorptive capacity, and the organizational culture. 
Implementation arrangements to respond to unprecedented events are normally decided based 
on the relevance and existing capacity of the responsible organizations. The assigned 
organizations need to undergo changes to fulfil the tasks. Meyer, Brooks, and Goes (1990) 
categorized two types of changes, namely first order (adaptation) and second order 
(metamorphosis) changes. The first order changes are continuous and occur within a stable 
system, whereas the second order changes transform fundamental properties or states of the 
system. Harrald (2006) concluded that nonstructural factors such as improvisation, adaptability, 
and creativity were critical to successful problem-solving in disaster response. Lee, Bae, Oh, 
Hong, and Moon (2014) conducted a system analysis on organizational conflict in the post-
disaster response of Hurricane Katrina and noted the importance of networking strength for the 
success of a response. Cohen and Levinthal (1990) labeled absorptive capacity as the ability of 
an organization to recognize the value of new, external information, assimilate it, and apply it. 
Absorptive capacity is largely a function of the organization’s level of prior related knowledge 
and is critical to its capabilities. 
The Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami brought the GOJ many unprecedented 
challenges. Among them were the measures to be taken regarding the radioactive material 
13 
 
discharged by the Fukushima nuclear accident.3 In August 2011, the GOJ designated the MOE 
as the focal agency responsible for decontamination and treatment of radioactive wastes 
through the “Act on Special Measures Concerning the Handling of Radioactive Pollution.” No 
government agency could have been a perfect match for this role in such an unprecedented 
event. Although the MOE had some experience and expertise related to “cleaning-up” 
measures, such as solid waste treatment and health-related measures like pollution control, the 
Japanese laws before the disaster had not anticipated a situation in which radioactive substances 
would be discharged into the environment. Furthermore, the MOEs previous roles had been 
mainly limited to the regulatory side and its direct implementation experiences had been limited 
to small-scale preservation works in national parks. 
The designated decontamination area, in which additional exposure doses of more than 1 
mSv/year were observed, spanned a wide area of eastern Japan affecting 100 municipalities in 
8 prefectures. The decontamination area in Fukushima Prefecture also covered a large part of 
its land area (Figure 2.1). The MOE was designated to directly implement decontamination in 
11 heavily contaminated municipalities in Fukushima Prefecture (Special Decontamination 
Areas), whereas municipal governments were tasked with decontamination in other areas. The 
soils and wastes removed by decontamination works were initially piled in temporary storage 
facilities or buried underground at sites like school playing fields and house gardens within 
each municipality. 
                                                     
3  Tanaka (2012) outlined the accident and lessons learned from the initial actions. 
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Source: Nishio, Kamei, Morikawa, and Ishikawa, 2016. 
Figure 2.1: Location of the Interim Storage Facility and Decontamination Areas  
Within Fukushima Prefecture (as of August 2013) 
 
The GOJ planned the ISF near Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Station to serve as a facility 
that gathers radioactive soil and waste from the temporary storage sites within Fukushima 
Prefecture, where the highest volume of soils and wastes were concentrated. The ISF was 
designed to store the soils and wastes up to 30 years until they are moved to a final disposal 
facility (Figure 2.2). The MOE issued the “Basic Policy on Interim Storage and Other Facilities” 
(MOE, 2011) and announced that it would make the utmost efforts to put ISF into service 
within three years from the start of the full-scale transfer of the soils and wastes to temporary 
storage sites, which was commonly understood as January 2015. 
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Source: International Atomic Energy Agency (2013). 
Figure 2.2: Storage and Disposal Scheme for Contaminated Soil and Waste  
in Fukushima Prefecture 
 
 Overview of the Transport to Interim Storage Facility 
The MOE estimated that the total transport volume would be up to 28 million m3, of which up 
to 12.5 million m3 would be transported by 2020, when the Tokyo Olympic and Paralympic 
Games will be held (Nishio, Kamei, Morikawa, & Ishikawa, 2016). Radioactive soil and waste 
from decontamination were stored mostly in 1 m3 plastic containers in temporary storage sites, 
and 10-ton loading-capacity dump trucks were planned as the transport vehicles as they were 
widely available (Figure 2.3). The transport plans drew a tremendous amount of attention from 
the residents, road users, municipalities, mass media, etc., due to the high volume, people’s 
fears of radioactive substances, and public frustration related to the Fukushima Dai-ichi 
accident and the government’s countermeasures. 
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Source: Nishio, Kamei, Morikawa, and Ishikawa, 2016. 
Figure 2.3: Transport Methods for the Radioactive Soil and Waste 
 
Preceding the transport planning and implementation, the ISF construction plan was discussed 
and negotiated with the local municipalities and residents. The MOE proposed an initial plan 
in March 2012. The Fukushima prefectural government accepted the MOE’s initiation of onsite 
surveys in November 2012 and established an Experts Panel on the ISF in April 2013. The 
MOE tried to meet the initial target of starting the ISF operation in January 2015 while the 
local governments and residents often criticized the MOE and GOJ on their hurried approaches. 
The MOE started the official transport planning process by organizing the “Working Group on 
Transport of Soil and Waste to the ISF” in December 2013. The working group was headed by 
a transport expert and included environmental and radiation experts and a local opinion leader. 
The main objective of the working group was to discuss the basic framework of the transport 
plan. The working group meetings were open to the mass media, and they were reported in 
substantial details by major media in Fukushima, Tokyo, and elsewhere. The working group’s 
chairperson made it clear in the first meeting that the MOE should “take all possible actions 
without making any taboos or assumptions” to gain public and local governments’ support 
(MOE, 2013). The MOE was expected to take extremely quick decisions and flexible actions 
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with careful consideration to the public reactions in order to commence the transport in 
accordance with the GOJ’s target timeframe. 
On 1 September 2015, the Fukushima Governor accepted the construction of the ISF. However, 
he explicitly announced that the acceptance was limited to construction of the ISF and not 
extended to transport of soil and waste into the ISF. He demanded that five measures be 
confirmed before the commencement of transport, including the national provision of 
maintenance and periphery measures along the transport route and guaranteed safety in relation 
to the ISF development and transport. 
The working group proposed the basic framework for transport in September 2014 after four 
rounds of meetings. The MOE held a consultation meeting with Fukushima Prefecture, all its 
municipal governments, and relevant agencies and issued the “Basic Plan for Transport of Soils 
and Waste to the ISF” in November 2014 (MOE, 2014). The Basic Plan comprised the 
following contents: 
(i) basic principles are to implement transport: (a) safely and securely, (b) promptly 
and smoothly, and (c) with public understanding and relevant agencies’ 
cooperation; 
(ii) transport volume, contents, implementing body, methods, etc.; 
(iii) basic policies are: (a) integrated management, (b) promote overall reconstruction of 
Fukushima Prefecture, (c) ensured safety of the residents and minimized 
environmental impact, (d) full use of expressways, (e) concentrated transport and 
use of large vehicles, (f) prepared response for accidents and other unexpected 
events, (g) monitoring and risk communication, (h) promotion of public 
understanding; and 
(iv) necessary measures towards the implementation are: (a) preparation of an 
implementation plan, (b) proper demarcation of responsibilities among relevant 
agencies, (c) enhancement of cooperation among relevant agencies, (d) 
implementation of pilot transport, (e) road and traffic measures, (f) training of the 
drivers and site workers.  
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The Implementation Plan for fiscal year (FY) 2014–2015 was issued in January 2015 after two 
more rounds of consultation meetings with the municipalities (MOE, 2015a). The 
Implementation Plan included the transport route totaling 1,600 km (Table 2.1) and assessment 
and monitoring plans along the route. As a means to enhance risk communication and 
management, the transport vehicles and containers would be monitored throughout the 
transport, and sufficient information would be disclosed (Figure 2.4). 
Table 2.1: Transport Routes by Road Category 
Road category Transport routes (km) 
National expressways, automobile highways (access controlled)  400 
National highways  500 
Other highways and roads  700 
Total  1,600 
Source: Nishio, Kamei, Morikawa, and Ishikawa, 2016. 
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Source: Nishio, Kamei, Morikawa, and Ishikawa, 2016. 
Figure 2.4: Management of Transport Vehicles and Containers 
 
The initial transport started in March 2015 as a pilot project planned for about one year; this 
was only two months behind the original target commencement date, despite the high level of 
difficulty. The working group assessed the results of the pilot transport project in December 
2015 and concluded that it had been largely smooth and without major problems (MOE, 2015b). 
 Factors for Smooth Planning and Initial Implementation 
Some government officials noted in interviews4 that the MOE could not be a good match for 
the task of transporting the soil and waste to ISF as it: (i) had not been responsible for the 
nuclear disaster, (ii) had no experience in direct implementation of large public works projects, 
and (iii) was not an administrative agency for the transport sector. A local newspaper in its 
                                                     
4  Based on interviews with management-level staff of the Reconstruction Agency on 23 January 2015 in the 
Reconstruction Agency headquarters in Tokyo, and with management-level staff of the MLIT on 21 October 
2014 in the MLIT headquarters in Tokyo, and management-level staff of the MOE on 20 February 2015 in the 
MOE headquarters in Tokyo. 
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series to commemorate five years after the disaster, raised anxieties that: (i) the MOE might 
have its limitations as the lead agency because it is not a responsible ministry in the fields of 
establishing and implementing ISFs and (ii) other ministries such as the Ministry of Land, 
Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism (MLIT) could not further enhance their cooperation 
through the means as seconding more experts due to increasing their own mandates and limited 
personnel resources (Fukushima Minpo Newspaper 2016). Despite such challenges, the MOE 
prepared the basic plan and the first implementation plan by January 2015 and commenced the 
transport in March 2015 without much deviation from the original schedule. The MOE 
completed a pilot project transporting 45,382 m3 radioactive soil and waste from 43 
municipalities in the FY 2015 smoothly and without major problems. 
This section reviews the factors that contributed to the MOE’s sound planning and smooth 
initial implementation despite the vast challenge. 
 Expertise from the Original Mandates 
The MOE, formerly the Environment Agency, was established in 1971 (upgraded to the MOE 
in 2001) in response to serious pollution-related diseases caused by Japan’s rapid 
industrialization. The MOE’s original mandates before the Fukushima accident comprised 
mainly: (a) global environment, (b) waste management and recycling, (c) air, water, soil, and 
ground environment regulation, (d) health and chemicals, and (e) national parks management. 
Its current organizational structure is shown in Figure 2.5. The mandate for waste management 
was transferred from the Ministry of Health to the MOE when the former Environment Agency 
was upgraded to the MOE in 2001.  
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Notes: As of Dec 2016; divisions, offices, and teams, except for the ones related to the 
Fukushima Dai-ichi accident, were omitted. 
Source: Author, based on MOE’s website. 
Figure 2.5: Organizational Structure of the Ministry of the Environment 
 
Large scale pollution-related diseases, including the internationally notable Minamata Disease, 
became a large social concern during the rapid industrialization of Japan in the 1960s, and the 
Environment Agency was established in 1971 to deal with the disasters created by pollutants 
from industrial activities. There are similarities between the pollution-related diseases and the 
Fukushima nuclear disaster in the sense that they both: (i) affected a large number of people 
spread across wide regions, (ii) attributed the primary responsibilities to companies’ industrial 
activities, and (iii) caused considerably large public unrest. It seems too distant in the past to 
be counted as relevant experience, but the MOE staff noted in interviews that the ISF team and 
its transport unit had regular coordination meetings with the Environmental Health Department, 
which is still in charge of Minamata disease and other pollution-related diseases, and shared 
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know-how, especially in risk management and communication.5 The interviewed staff noted 
that this coordination greatly enhanced the risk management aspects of the transport planning 
and implementation as the public had high anxiety about the health effects of radioactive soil 
and waste.6 This can be seen as a use of the MOE’s potential absorptive capacity, which may 
have been overlooked when the task was assigned to the MOE. The absorptive capacity was 
enhanced by active coordination and information exchange within the MOE, which was 
encouraged by the MOE’s organizational culture that will be reviewed in the next section. 
In terms of absorptive capacity, the MOE had other expertise from its original mandates related 
to the transport to the ISF. The MOE handled transport of polychlorinated biphenyl (PCB) 
wastes through the Japan Environmental Storage & Safety Corporation (JESCO, formerly 
Japan Environmental Safety Corporation)7, a special company under the MOE. JESCO was 
responsible for the implementation of treatment and transport of PCB wastes under the MOE’s 
oversight. PCBs were produced and used in throughout the country until 1972, when the 
production and distribution was banned. PCB waste was transported by licensed companies to 
JESCO’s treatment facilities following technical guidelines set by the MOE. The MOE 
assigned JESCO to be responsible for a major role in the integrated transport management for 
the transport to the ISF (Figure 2.6) because JESCO had acquired expertise in the safe transport 
and monitoring of hazardous materials through their management of PCB waste (Sugiura 2014).  
JESCO’s experience and expertise were well utilized in establishing and implementing the 
monitoring systems for transporting vehicles and containers as noted in the Implementation 
Plan (MOE, 2015a). According to MOE staff, discussions were often held between the relevant 
MOE staff and JESCO staff from the preparation stage of the basic and implementation plans 
                                                     
5  Based on the interviews with the MOE staff on 9 May 2016 in the MOE headquarters in Tokyo. The 
coordination meetings were chaired by the Administrative Vice Minister. 
6  In addition to the interviewed staff in footnote 5, other managerial-level MOE staff also noted this point in the 
interview on 13 November 2014 in the MOE headquarters in Tokyo. 
7  The company name was changed in December 2014 and officially tasked with the ISF related matters, when 
Japan Environmental Safety Corporation Act was revised to Japan Environmental Storage and Safety 
Corporation Act. 
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even before JESCO was officially tasked to the ISF matters.8, 9 The MOE’s expertise in PCB 
treatment was considered as realized absorptive capacity as the government considered its use 
from the time when the decontamination task was assigned to the MOE (Sugiura, 2014). 
 
Source: “Implementation Plan for Transport of Soil and Waste to the ISF in fiscal years 2014–2015”. 
Figure 2.6: Structure of Integrated Transport Management 
 
As described above, the MOE’s original experiences and expertise were used particularly in (i) 
risk management and communication and (ii) monitoring of transport vehicles and containers. 
The MOE monitored radiation dose rates and other environmental indicators along the 
transport routes and disclosed these publicly. Additionally, transport containers and vehicles 
were individually tagged and checked for their contamination levels, locations, etc. The MOE 
and municipal governments established information centers in major locations such as 
municipal government offices and train stations. Such risk communication and management 
measures were necessary to cope with public fears related to the unknown risks of nuclear 
                                                     
8  Based on the interviews with the MOE staff on 9 May 2016 in the MOE headquarters in Tokyo. 
9  Footnote 7. 
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hazards10, as the local residents were highly sensitive about the invisible risks of radioactive 
substances and skeptical regarding the information provided by and actions of the Tokyo 
Electric Power Company and GOJ on the causes and handling of the nuclear disaster. Moreover, 
a majority of the public associated the MOE with protection of the environment and 
preservation of national parks, and this perception was advantageous in obtaining public 
support compared to the public’s perceptions of other agencies directly responsible for the 
nuclear disaster. 
In summary, the following has been identified as factors contributed to successful planning and 
initial implementation of transport to the ISF in the section: (i) realized absorptive capacity 
(JESCO’s expertise) was utilized and (ii) unexpected potential absorptive capacity (experience 
from pollution-related diseases) was utilized. 
 Organizational Culture and Capacity Enhancement  
Original experience and expertise mainly contributed to mitigating the public fears about the 
unknown risks of nuclear hazards through use of realized and potential absorptive capacities. 
However, there were also doubts over the MOE’s capacity to plan and implement a large-scale 
transport project. This section reviews the organizational culture of the MOE and its capacity 
enhancement through the initial experience of directly implementing the decontamination 
measures. 
The MOE became responsible for the decontamination of radioactive pollution when it was 
assigned the mandate through the GOJ’s act in August 2011. Although the decontamination 
and ISF were handled by separate teams, the two teams both report mainly to the director 
generals of the Environmental Management Bureau and Decontamination Technology of 
Radioactive Materials Bureau (Figure 2.5). The teams worked closely under the common 
                                                     
10  Local government officials repeatedly requested such measures in the coordination meetings and other 
occasions according to MOE staff (interview on 9 May 2016 in the MOE headquarters in Tokyo). 
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management and through frequent coordination meetings at various levels. 11  In the 
headquarters, the two teams had been physically placed next to each other and were merged 
into one large room in early 2015. The MOE established the Fukushima Office for 
Environmental Restoration in Fukushima City in January 2012 to enhance implementation and 
local coordination capacity. The Fukushima Office also had both decontamination and ISF 
functions and acted as a common focal point in dealing with local governments and residents. 
MOE staff noted that such organizational arrangements enabled the MOE to smoothly transfer 
the capacity acquired through direct implementation of the decontamination works to support 
the tasks on the ISF and its transport planning.12 
In addition to the capacity enhancement thorough direct implementation, it was found through 
the interviews13 that the MOE’s organizational culture played an important role in taking “all 
possible actions without taboos and assumptions” as the working group’s chairperson had 
requested in the first meeting in 2013 (MOE, 2013).  
The MOE identified cooperation from other ministries as the most important factor for a quick 
start to the decontamination works (MOE, 2016a). The MOE had little experience and expertise 
in direct implementation of transport projects, as it had been mainly a regulator and not a 
project planning or implementation organization. Its main function in transport was to review 
and provide opinions to environmental impact assessments of projects. The MLIT, on the other 
hand, was the key agency with transport sector expertise and project implementation capacity. 
Therefore, the MOE requested the MLIT to provide secondees to enhance its implementation 
capacities, and key positions like the director general for Decontamination Technology of 
Radioactive Materials Bureau, director-level positions in Decontamination Team and 
Fukushima ISF Team (Figure 2.5) were allocated to MLIT secondees. Also, a section chief 
                                                     
11  MOE staff noted that coordination meetings were held among relevant deputy director level staff from ISF, 
decontamination, and other relevant departments about every two weeks in the headquarters and among 
director general and director level about every month in Fukushima Office (interview on 9 May 2016 in the 
MOE headquarters in Tokyo). 
12  Interview with management-level staff of the MOE on 20 February 2015 in the MOE headquarters in Tokyo. 
13  Footnote 5. 
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position for the ISF Transport Unit within Fukushima ISF Team was created in 2014 and taken 
by a secondee from the MLIT. 
In addition to the secondment arrangement with the MLIT, the MOE used a relatively large 
number of experts from private sector in response to increasing needs related to the Fukushima 
nuclear disaster. The GOJ started promoting exchange of expertise between the public and 
private sectors in 1999, when Act on Personnel Exchange Between the Government Sector and 
Private Enterprises was enacted. The act was revised in 2006 to further promote employment 
from the private sector by reducing some restrictions. The MOE had a relatively high number 
of staff recruited form the private sector with 45 staff (3.5% against the allocated total number 
of staff) already in the FY 2011, when the Fukushima nuclear disaster happened (Table 2.2). 
Furthermore, the number increased to 605 (20.5% against the total) in FY 2016. The ISF 
Transport Team in the headquarters comprised six staff, and majority (four out of six) was from 
the private sector with only one originally from the MOE. MOE’s management-level staff 
recognized that use of these external experts was vital to smooth planning and initial 
implementation of transport to the ISF.14 
Table 2.2: Number of Staff Recruited from the Private Sector 
 
FY 
2011 
(=A) 
FY 
2012 
FY 
2013 
FY 
2014 
FY 
2015 
FY 
2016 
(=B) 
Increase 
(= B–A) 
MOE 
 45 
(3.5%)  
 166 
(8.3%)  
 316 
(11.2%)  
 470 
(17.0%)  
 587 
(20.1%)  
 605 
(20.5%)  
 560 
(17.0%)  
MLIT 
 324 
(0.5%)  
 411 
(0.7%)  
 446 
(0.8%)  
 500 
(0.9%)  
 516 
(0.9%)  
 546 
(0.9%)  
 222 
(0.4%)  
Reconstruction 
Agency 
 -     39 
(33.1%)  
 54 
(32.0%)  
 58 
(31.7%)  
 60 
(31.4%)  
 51 
(25.9%)  
 51 
(25.9%)  
GOJ Total 
 4,152 
(1.4%)  
 4,167 
(1.4%)  
 4,213 
(1.4%)  
 4,690 
(1.6%)  
 4,969 
(1.7%)  
 5,245 
(1.8%)  
 1,093 
(0.4%)  
FY = fiscal year, GOJ = Government of Japan, MLIT = Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, 
Transport and Tourism, MOE = Ministry of the Environment. 
Notes: The numbers of staff are as of 1 October of each year.  
The numbers in parentheses are ratio of the externally-recruited staff against the total 
number of the staff. 
Source: Cabinet Secretariat (2017). 
                                                     
14  Based on interviews with management-level staff of MOE (non-secondees) on 18 March 2015 in Tokyo. 
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What are the organizational culture characteristics of the MOE, and what roles did they play in 
the ISF transport planning and implementation? The GOJ ministries are notorious for their 
strong sectionalism as pointed out in various literatures.15 That is especially true in a big 
ministry like the MLIT which has a substantial amount of vested authority and a large budget. 
In contrast, the MOE, at least until the Fukushima-related works, had been considered a 
relatively new and small ministry (Table 2.3). Not surprisingly, the two ministries had 
contrasting organizational cultures. Management-level secondees from the MLIT to the MOE 
noted in the interviews that there are major differences in the organizational cultures of the two 
ministries as following: (i) junior staff in the MOE often come directly to high-level 
management staff such as director generals for briefing and discussion without the middle 
managements while junior staff in the MLIT need to go through hierarchy of section chiefs, 
deputy directors, directors, deputy director generals, etc. before reaching director generals and 
above; (ii) information is generally more frequently shared with the politically-appointed 
managers (the Minister, Vice Ministers, and Parliament Secretaries) in more detail in the MOE, 
and such high-level managers more directly interact with staff; (iii) information sharing and 
discussions within the MOE are very open, often shared through emails among relevant 
sections regardless of the staff ranks; and (iv) MOE-proper staff16 are generally friendly to 
secondees and other external staff and value their respective expertise in required fields.17 They 
noted that the MOE generally had a friendly atmosphere and flat decision-making structure, 
and such an atmosphere promoted a smooth and productive work environment especially for 
the secondees and externally recruited staff. Some interviewees also noted that some of the 
above characteristics are unique to the sections related to decontamination and ISF due to the 
unprecedented challenges, urgency, and high-level commitment of the government on the 
                                                     
15  For example, Nishio (2003). 
16  “Proper staff” here refers to those who were recruited in the MOE from the beginning of their career as opposed 
to those who were either seconded from different ministries and companies or recruited as mid-career experts. 
Most of the central government officials in Japan are recruited soon after graduation from schools and 
employed for their entire career lives. 
17  Based on interviews with managerial-level staff of the MOE, who were in charge of decontamination and ISF 
matters, on 20 February 2015 and 13 November 2014 in the MOE headquarters in Tokyo. 
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Fukushima-related issues although these characteristics generally reflect the overall 
organizational culture of the MOE. 
Since its establishment, a substantial number of the MOE’s management and other staff 
included secondees and transferred staff from different ministries and agencies, which include 
the Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare, the Ministry of Finance (MOF), and MLIT. The 
position of administrative vice minister of the MOE, the top-level bureaucratic post (except for 
political appointees), was often taken by secondees or staff transferred from other ministries. 
In addition, the number of staff rapidly increased after the Fukushima accident, from 1,259 in 
FY 2011 to 2,953 in FY 2015, more than doubling within the first three years, whereas the 
numbers of employees in the whole GOJ and other large ministries like MLIT were in a decline 
(Table 2.3).  
Table 2.3: Allocated Number of Staff in Relevant Government Organizations 
 
FY 2011 
(=A) 
FY 
2012 
FY 
2013 
FY 
2014 
FY 
2015 
FY 
2016 
(=B) 
Increase 
(= B–A) 
MOE 1,298 2,010 2,814 2,762 2,920 2,953 1,655 
MLIT 60,222 59,763 59,466 59,054 58,815 58,573 -1,649 
Reconstruction 
Agency - 118 169 183 191 197 197 
GOJ Total 301,058 299,758 298,341 297,340 297,091 296,766 -4,292 
FY = fiscal year, GOJ = Government of Japan, MLIT = Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, 
Transport and Tourism, MOE = Ministry of the Environment. 
Note:  All the numbers are allocation at the end of each FY. 
Source: Cabinet Secretariat (2016). 
As a relatively new and small agency with staff from various career backgrounds, the MOE 
had developed a culture of openness and flat decision-making. Unlike GOJ’s general 
organizational culture typically observed in large and long-lasting agencies, the MOE had 
relatively higher individualism culture with weak grid and group dimensions. Such cultural 
traits were inevitably enhanced in Fukushima-related matters due to a large influx of external 
experts and the nature of the tasks as unprecedented challenges, urgency, and high-level 
commitment of the government. In other words, the group and grid dimensions in Figure 1.1 
29 
 
were further weakened to create higher levels of individualism, where externally recruited staff 
could work smoothly, fully being able to utilize their expertise in respective fields without 
much conflict with the existing staff. 
As noted in the interviews with the management-level staff, such an organizational culture 
supported MOE’s existing and externally-recruited staff considerably in facing the 
unprecedented challenges and the high media and public attention to the ISF. New conditions 
had continuously been set by local governments based on critical public opinions. The MOE 
needed to respond with new and innovative approaches that required very quick decision-
making on various occasions. Conventional bureaucratic approaches, where lots of so-called 
“red tape” hampers quick responses, would likely not have worked effectively in such 
circumstances. 
In summary, the following were identified as enabling factors for flexible responses of the 
MOE in successful planning and initial implementation of the transport to the ISF: 
(i) realized absorptive capacity (JESCO’s expertise) was utilized; 
(ii) unexpected potential absorptive capacity (experience from pollution-related 
diseases) was utilized; 
(iii) a large number of external staff members and their capacity were well utilized; 
(iv) a friendly and open atmosphere and flat decision-making structure, where the grid 
dimension is weakened, and such an atmosphere promoted a smooth and productive 
work environment; and 
(v) higher individualism culture with the weak group dimension supported flexible 
responses of MOE’s existing and externally-recruited staff. 
 Other Experiences by the Ministry of the Environment 
This section reviews two other cases in which the MOE responded to external requirements 
and expectations. These cases are analyzed mainly to verify the factors identified in the main 
case of the MOE (Sections 2.1–2.4). 
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 Basic Environment Law 
Japan faced a number of domestic and global environmental issues in the early 1990s, such as 
municipal and industrial waste management, nitrogen oxides, conventional water pollution, 
climate change, and environmental aid (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development [OECD], 1994). In response to such issues, the Environment Agency formulated 
the Basic Environment Law, which was adopted in 1993. In response to the United Nations 
Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) held in June 1992, the Basic 
Environment Law set forth the GOJ’s basic principles in the environmental policy, 
responsibilities of various social bodies, and basic programs to the world as a global pioneer 
(Masuhara, 1993a). 
The Basic Environment Law enhanced the Environment Agency’s strong capacity in 
conventional environmental issues and expanded the mandate to include emerging issues. 
Since its establishment in 1971, the Environment Agency’s main administrative tool had been 
regulations, typically through laws such as the Basic Law for Environmental Pollution Control 
(adopted in 1967) and the Nature Conservation Law (adopted in 1972). By the early 1990s, 
Japan’s rapid economic development created new environmental issues such as urban, non-
industrial wastes. Global environmental concerns also arose, such as the depletion of the ozone 
layer, global warming, degradation of tropical rain forests, and extinction of endangered 
species. Regulating through the conventional statutory mechanisms became insufficient, and 
alternative measures such as economic approaches and environmental impact assessments 
(EIAs) were expected (Masuhara, 1993b). The Basic Environment Law provided various 
breakthroughs for new measures and became a turning point for Japan’s environmental policies 
(Matsushita, 2014). 
From the organizational culture and absorptive capacity perspectives, what were the factors 
that contributed to creating such a breakthrough and turning point? National government 
officers have strong motivation to formulate a new law, and the meritorious persons who 
actually contribute to the formulation of a cabinet law are widely recognized within concerned 
ministries, and they will have a greater chance for promotion or better jobs after retirement. 
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However, the Environment Agency appointed an external staff from the MOF as the director 
of the law formulation office and assembled 27 staff from various departments in the agency 
to be the office members (R. Fujikura, Nakayama, & M. Fujikura, 2016). 
The director was transferred from the MOF in 1992, when the law formulation office was 
established. Although the senior management of the agency was dominated by secondees 
because it had only been 21 years since its establishment, a new secondee from an external 
organization must have functioned as a catalyst to bring in new ideas. Also, establishing an ad 
hoc office with a substantial number of staff must have been challenging for a small 
organization like the Environment Agency at that time. Several MOE staff members noted in 
interviews that it has been one of the MOE’s personnel management style to manage its staff 
flexibly through what they informally call “staff hunting.” 18  The managers search for 
appropriate staff members and appoint them through joint-appointments to the ad hoc team in 
addition to their original mandates, which makes easier and faster to create ad hoc teams than 
officially creating new posts and appointing staff full-time. A management-level staff noted 
that the MOE, having been relatively small in size, had a culture of openness and respect to 
individual staff member’s initiatives regardless of their origins and that such openness must 
have supported utilization of diverse individual ideas within the agency.19 
Another factor was effective use of absorptive capacity and avoidance of sectionalism through 
experts’ councils and top-down political decision-making. The Environment Agency expected 
that it would be difficult to obtain consensus through the ordinary procedure whereby officers 
of the agency independently obtained consent from each of the concerned ministries such as 
the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI, later the Ministry of Economy, Trade 
and Industry [METI]), the Ministry of Construction, and the Ministry of Transport (both of 
them later merged to form the MLIT). To address this issue, the agency established a small 
committee that included members nominated by the concerned ministries. These other 
ministries provided their input through their representatives on the committee. All discussions 
                                                     
18  Interviews with MOE’s deputy director level staff members on 9 May 2016 in the MOE headquarters in Tokyo 
and on 23 Feb 2017 in Manila. 
19  Interview with MOE’s director general level staff member on 27 October 2014 in Tokyo. 
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and reconciliations were conducted within the committee meetings (R. Fujikura, Nakayama, & 
M. Fujikura, 2016). In this way, absorptive capacity was enhanced by gathering expertise from 
other ministries and stakeholders. Also, along with reconciliation within the government, two 
big-named politicians created the basic concepts of the law behind closed doors, which led to 
an announcement by the Prime Minister to formulate a new law appropriate to the global 
environmental era (R. Fujikura, Nakayama, & M. Fujikura, 2016). The MOE leveraged 
external decisions, inputs from external committees, and political power to enhance its 
absorptive capacity and overcome sectionalism to formulate a breakthrough law. 
In summary, the following can be identified as contributing factors for successful establishment 
of the Basic Environment Law: 
(i) open organizational culture created through flexible personnel appointments 
supported utilization of diverse individual ideas; and 
(ii) capacity of external staff and committee was utilized. 
 Climate Change and Carbon Tax 
Responses to global warming and climate change 20  were new external requirements that 
emerged in the late 1980s. The United Nations (UN) Framework Convention on Climate 
Change was adopted in the UNCED in 1992. The Environment Agency took the lead in the 
Japanese response to these issues through the formulation of the Basic Environment Law, 
although other ministries such as MITI and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs were also interested 
in the issue (R. Fujikura, Nakayama, & M. Fujikura, 2016). Japan ratified the Framework 
Convention in 1993, and the convention became effective in 1994. The third Conference of the 
Parties (COP3) was held in Kyoto, Japan in 1997, and the Kyoto Protocol, which addressed 
greenhouse gas reduction targets during the 2008–2012 period, was adopted. 
The MOE led various initiatives after it took charge of the climate change issues. The Act on 
Promotion of Global Warming Countermeasures was adopted in 1998 (the MOE is the 
responsible ministry together with METI and public works ministries and agencies). “Cool and 
                                                     
20  Hereafter, global warming and climate change are called “climate change” unless distinction is needed. 
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Warm Biz” and “Team Minus 6%” campaigns successfully contributed to raising people’s 
awareness of climate change issues, and similar campaigns were introduced in the UN 
headquarters and other countries (United Nations University, 2008). The MOE also intended 
to include climate change within its jurisdiction to introduce an economic instrument that drew 
attention as an effective measure of mitigation in the Basic Environment Law (R. Fujikura, 
Nakayama, & M. Fujikura, 2016).  
Starting in 2003, the MOE conducted studies and worked to introduce a new tax until the Tax 
for Climate Change Mitigation (hereafter referred to as “Carbon Tax”) was finally adopted in 
2012. Article 22 of the Basic Environment Law stipulated economic instruments, and it served 
as the basis for introduction of the Carbon Tax. The Carbon Tax initially came into force on 1 
October 2012, and the rate was gradually increased until 1 April 2016 (Figure 2.7). The total 
revenue was estimated at JPY 39.1 billion for the first year and JPY 262.3 billion for the normal 
years (MOE, 2012). The Carbon Tax is not an earmarked special purpose tax, per se, but all 
the revenue is managed under the Energy Measure Special Account (Energy Demand Count) 
and allotted to energy-oriented CO2 emissions restraint measures (Ito, 2012). 
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Source: MOE (2012). 
Figure 2.7: Tax Rate and Enforcement Stage of the Carbon Tax 
 
The process of introduction of the Carbon Tax included multiple hurdles involving various 
stakeholders and provides interesting perspectives on the organizational culture and absorptive 
capacity of the ministry. The MOE (and the former Environment Agency) first initiated studies 
regarding an environment tax in the early 1990s through the Workshop on Environmental 
Taxes (1991–1994), the Workshop on Economic Instruments like Environmental Taxes and 
Charges (1994–1997), the Workshop on Utilization of Economic Instruments in Environmental 
Policy (1998–2000), and the Central Environment Council (2001–). It is obvious that these 
long-term studies and repeated unsuccessful attempts to introduce the tax gradually built up the 
potential absorptive capacity of this relatively small organization including capacities to 
manage various stakeholders. The MOE had been cautious in its proposal due to strong 
opposition from the METI and industry groups, and the resulting low tax rate was suspected to 
be insufficient to create effective emission reduction incentives (Shiina, 2006). The first 
submission of the Carbon Tax request to the MOF was in August 2003. The MOE’s proposal 
has been characterized by low-rates and special purpose usage—the tax rate was set relatively 
35 
 
low (JPY3,400 per ton of carbon in the initial proposal), and the revenue (JPY 950 billion 
estimated in the initial proposal) was to be earmarked for climate change measures. The tax 
rate has gradually been decreased further during the intervening years with the rates being 
developed in coordination with various stakeholders. 
The major stakeholders in the introduction of the Carbon Tax and their positions can be 
summarized as in Table 2.4. Within the GOJ, the MOE and the Ministry of Agriculture, 
Forestry and Fisheries (MAFF) shared a common interest in using the tax revenue for climate 
change measures, including reforestation, and two ministries co-submitted the proposals in 
August 2004. The MOF welcomed new revenue sources but placed a higher priority on raising 
the consumption tax rate as the resulting revenue increase was much higher (the consumption 
tax rate was raised from 3% to 5% in April 1997 and to 8% in April 2014). Although the MOF 
was supposed to be neutral as the appraisal ministry, Aoki and Suzuki (2007) pointed out that 
a considerable number of secondees from the MOF to the MOE functioned favorably for 
introduction of the Carbon Tax in practice. Similarly to the case of the Basic Environment Law 
in Section 2.4.1, utilization of external staff functioned favorably in this case. The MLIT also 
held a relatively neutral position as its largest interest had been maintaining the earmarked 
road-related taxes during the early years of carbon tax discussions.21 The MOE, being also 
aware that the road-related taxes had been highly politically sensitive, acted flexibly to avoid 
inclusion of those taxes in its proposal instead of trying to achieve high impact and revenue 
(Aoki & Suzuki, 2007). 
  
                                                     
21  The earmarked road-related taxes were abolished in 2009. 
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Table 2.4: Major Stakeholders in the Introduction of the Carbon Tax 
Pro-Carbon Tax 
Coordinators/Neutral Anti-Carbon Tax 
Low rate/special purpose Revenue neutral 
- MOE 
- MAFF 
- LDP Environment 
Committee 
- LDP Agriculture 
Committee 
- Japan Association of 
Corporate Executives 
- JACSES 
(environmental 
NGO) 
- DPJ 
- MOF 
- MLIT 
- Government Tax 
Commission 
- LDP Research 
Commission on the 
Tax System 
- METI 
- LDP Economy and 
Trade Committee 
- Japan Federation of 
Economic 
Organizations 
DPJ = Democratic Party of Japan, JACSES = Japan Center for Sustainable Environment and 
Society, LDP = Liberal Democratic Party, MAFF = Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and 
Fisheries, METI = Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, MOE = Ministry of the 
Environment, MOF = Ministry of Finance, NGO = non-governmental organization 
Source: Author, based on Aoki and Suzuki (2007). 
The largest opposition within the GOJ was from the METI (and former MITI). The METI 
opposed the Carbon Tax mainly because the ministry (i) was representing the negative opinions 
of domestic industry, which was likely to shoulder the financial burden, and (ii) did not want 
the MOE to interfere with the METI’s mandates for energy policies and related earmarked tax 
revenues. This is a typical example of the strong sectionalism of the GOJ, where ministries 
vigorously protect their existing jurisdictional territories. In 2002, the METI introduced 
“greening” taxation, applying new taxes on coal and increasing budget allocations to new 
energies and energy efficiency enhancement measures, and shared the lead ministry 
responsibility with the MOE. This was considered the METI’s attempt to maintain its lead role 
and protect the energy earmarked budget by creating a de facto environmental tax with the 
MOE (Aoki & Suzuki, 2007). The MOE officials had various views on whether or not to accept 
the METI’s proposal. In the end, a memorandum was signed between the MOE and the METI 
ministers confirming that carbon taxes should be different from the green taxation under the 
energy special account (Yamaguchi, 2016). However, this funding arrangement, where 
subsidies and grants are provided through the energy special account, became the basis for 
allocation of the Carbon Tax revenue when the tax was introduced in 2012. Initially, the MOE 
was criticized for insufficient implementation capacity with multiple incidents of overlapping 
subsidies and implementation stagnation (Aoki & Suzuki, 2007). However, the MOE has 
gradually acquired implementation capacities especially through implementation of 
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cooperative projects with other ministries, where the implementation responsibilities were 
shared with other ministries. Such co-implementation projects progressively grew in the budget 
size and coverage area. In FY 2016, 22 subprojects were co-implementation projects with other 
ministries such as the MLIT (10 subprojects), the METI (9 subprojects), the MAFF (4 
subprojects), the Ministry of Health, Labor, and Welfare (1 subproject), the Ministry of Internal 
Affairs and Communications (1 subproject), and the National Police Agency (1 subproject).22 
In addition, the co-implementation projects were handled not only by the Global Environment 
Bureau but also by other major three bureaus of the MOE (MOE, 2016b).23 MOE officials 
pointed out in interviews that experiences through the co-implementation projects helped 
enhancement of implementation capacity for the subprojects utilizing the Carbon Tax.24 
Political top-down initiatives were not effective in the case of the Carbon Tax. The Liberal 
Democratic Party (LDP) was reported to be including the “establishment of an environmental 
tax” in its manifesto for the 2003 general election (Nihonkeizai Shimbun, 2003). However, it 
was removed from the manifesto through coordination with the LDP’s Economy and Trade 
Committee. On the other hand, the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), which took power from 
September 2009 to December 2012, had included introduction of an environmental tax in the 
party’s basic policies and manifestos since 2003. The MOE increased the tax rates (resulting 
in an estimated revenue of more than JPY 1 trillion) in its proposal submitted in November 
2009, soon after the DPJ took power. However, the DPJ had campaigned strongly for a drastic 
reduction of the gasoline tax with public demonstrations and slogans such as “Team for 
Reducing the Gasoline Price,” and its position on fossil fuel consumption was contradictory 
from the beginning (Yamaguchi, 2012). 
                                                     
22  The numbers do not add up to the total (22 projects) as some projects were co-implemented with more than 
one ministry.  
23  Based on the co-implementation projects in FY 2017. The three bureaus are Minister’s Secretariat (Waste 
Management and Recycling Department), Environmental Policy Bureau, and Environmental Management 
Bureau. 
24  Interviews with MOE’s deputy director level staff members on 9 May 2016 in the MOE headquarters in Tokyo 
and on 23 Feb 2017 in Manila. 
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In the process of introduction of the Carbon Tax, the MOE had to patiently keep requesting the 
establishment of the new tax for more than 8 years, even following the breakthrough inclusion 
of the economic instruments in the Basic Environmental Law, due to the strong sectionalism 
in the relevant ministries and lack of political leadership. However, the MOE managed to create 
the taxation mechanism as low-rate with special purpose usage, reflecting the opinions of 
various stakeholders, and the utilization of the special purpose tax revenues were smooth 
thanks to initial struggle through co-implementation of energy special account with the METI 
and other ministries. 
In summary, the following can be identified as contributing factors for successful introduction 
of the tax and smooth implementation of the special purpose revenues: 
(i) utilization of external staff and capacity functioned favorably; and 
(ii) potential absorptive capacity of the MOE was enhanced through co-implementation 
projects with various ministries. 
 Findings and Discussions 
This section examined three examples of the MOE’s responses to external requirements and 
expectations. The main case was transport of radioactive soil and waste to the Fukushima ISF 
by the MOE and analyzed the factors that enabled a relatively small and inexperienced 
institution to smoothly handle the unprecedented challenge. The interviews and dialogues with 
various GOJ officials revealed that some questioned why the MOE should have been assigned 
the task of decontamination and transport of the radioactive soil and waste to the ISF and 
doubted its ability to be successful in the task as it was neither an organization with 
implementation capacity nor the organization responsible for the nuclear disaster. However, 
the MOE promptly and successfully prepared plans and started initial implementation of the 
transport to ISF despite unprecedented challenges and public pressure. 
Other experiences of the MOE were also reviewed to analyze its responses to external 
requirements and expectations—namely the formulation of the Basic Environment Law and 
measures to address climate change, especially the Carbon Tax.  
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The Basic Environment Law was adopted in 1993 in response to emerging environmental 
issues, including the need for sustainable development addressed in the UNCED in 1992. The 
law served as the turning point in many aspects of Japan’s environmental policy approach and 
provided breakthroughs in areas such as climate change and EIA. The MOE took the lead on 
various initiatives regarding climate change, and the review in this section focused mainly on 
the creation of the Carbon Tax. Various environmental taxes had been studied since the early 
1990s, and the first request to the MOF was submitted in 2003. The Carbon Tax was finally 
adopted in 2012 with a relatively low tax rate and with special purposes for the use of the 
revenue. 
Several facts and observations about the reviewed cases were of interest from the 
organizational culture and absorptive capacity perspectives. Table 2.5 summarizes the 
identified contributing factors for innovative and flexible responses to the external 
requirements and expectations in the cases of the Ministry of the Environment. 
Table 2.5: Identified Contributing Factors from the Cases  
of the Ministry of the Environment 
Contributing Factors 
Case 1: 
Transport to 
ISF 
Case 2: Basic 
Environment 
Law 
Case 3: Carbon 
Tax 
Open and flexible organizational 
culture (weakening of the grid 
dimension) 
+ +  
Individualized culture (weakening of 
the group dimension) 
+   
Utilization of potential absorptive 
capacity 
+  + 
Utilization of realized absorptive 
capacity 
+   
Utilization of external capacity + + + 
ISF = interim storage facility 
Source: Author. 
Based on the reviewed cases and a series of interviews through the study, the MOE in general 
was observed to have an organizational culture with an atmosphere friendly to external staff 
and flat decision-making. In the case of the transport to ISF, some key positions were filled 
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with secondees from other relevant ministries and most of the responsible staff members were 
externally recruited temporary staff, resulting in a high level of staff inflow to a relatively small 
organization; the same was true in the case of the Basic Environment Law formulation, where 
the director was seconded from the MOF and the office members were appointed from various 
other departments (although from within the agency and not externally in this case). It was also 
noted that the secondment arrangement with the MOF worked favorably in the case of the 
Carbon Tax. As reviewed in the cases, the MOE’s organizational culture with its friendly 
atmosphere and flat decision-making, or the weakened grid dimension, contributed to its ability 
to adopt to unprecedented challenges flexibly, and to promptly acquire an implementation 
capacity with a rapid influx of new and external staff. 
From the perspective of absorptive capacity, seemingly unrelated experiences from the 
management of pollution-related diseases acted as a key absorptive capacity in the case of the 
transport to ISF, especially for the risk communication and management needed to properly 
address the high degree of public anxiety over the unknown risks of nuclear hazards. This was 
potential absorptive capacity that existed in the MOE, but was not explicitly considered in the 
decision about the implementation arrangements. Another absorptive capacity factor in the 
transport to ISF was the capacity acquired through the transport and treatment of PCBs. This 
was taken into consideration from the early stages of planning as realized absorptive capacity, 
and the JESCO, the MOE’s special purpose company for PCB treatment, was officially 
assigned to undertake the ISF tasks in the implementation stage by a revised JESCO 
establishment law.  
The MOE was required to act quickly and flexibly, especially toward the end of the planning 
process, to commence the transport to ISF as per the commitment made by the GOJ despite the 
belated progress of the ISF development and the difficulties in coordination with the municipal 
governments. Flexibility was also a key element in the preparation of the Basic Environment 
Law and the Carbon Tax, as the strong sectionalism within the GOJ required tough negotiations 
and coordination with the relevant ministries. The MOE effectively internalized expertise from 
other ministries through secondment arrangements and joint implementation with key 
ministries. It was also observed that issues were often brought to open discussions, such as 
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external committees (e.g., Working Group on Transport of Soil and Waste to ISF, a small 
committee for the Basic Environment Law), to avoid delays and overcome sectionalism, partly 
because the public often supports environmental improvement. Top-down decision-making 
from the political powers was also a favorable factor in terms of quick responses by the 
organization. 
It is recommended that a review of an organization’s various experiences, culture, and 
absorptive capacity be required for innovative and flexible responses by organizations through 
setting up implementation arrangements for responses to an unprecedented challenge that 
requires quick decisions and flexible actions. This review should include all experiences and 
characteristics, even those not seemingly directly related to the current situation. 
 
Note 
Main contents of this chapter were published as below: 
Nishimura, M. (2016). Transport of Radioactive Soil and Waste to the Fukushima Interim 
Storage Facility—From Organizational Arrangement Perspectives. Business and Management 
Studies, 2(4), 15-20. http://dx.doi.org/10.11114/bms.v2i4.1938 
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Chapter 3  
 
Application of Road Safety Audits and Other 
Experiences by the Ministry of Land, 
Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism 
 
Road safety audits (RSAs) have been applied in many developing and developed countries as 
a way to enhance the safety of road infrastructure since they were first introduced in the late 
1980s in the United Kingdom. RSAs have proven to be an effective tool to enhance the design 
of both new and existing roads from an overall safety perspective. In the early 2000s, the 
Government of Japan (GOJ) reviewed RSAs as well as new public management (NPM) (both 
viewed as good practices in the United Kingdom and other countries) and now promotes RSAs 
in developing countries through its bilateral and multilateral official development assistance 
(ODA). However, although NPM was applied as performance management of road 
administrations (PMRA) widely within Japan, RSAs have not been applied on Japan’s 
domestic road projects. This article reviews factors that may explain why the GOJ has not 
applied RSAs from the organizational culture perspective of the Ministry of Land, 
Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism (MLIT), which administers the Japanese road transport 
subsector. The article also reviews an RSA pilot project started in 2013 and a nation-wide pilot 
program started in 2015. Factors that may influence how the GOJ can apply RSAs successfully 
are reviewed in line with the MLIT’s absorptive capacity. 
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 Introduction 
The RSA process was developed to proactively improve the safety of road networks by 
identifying and reporting on the safety status of the network. An RSA is a useful device for 
identifying potential safety improvements at any time in the project’s lifespan including the 
planning, design, construction, or as-built stage (Owers & Wilson, 2001). RSAs were first 
introduced in the United Kingdom in the late 1980s, and a guideline was published in the 
United Kingdom in 1990. Many countries have applied RSAs since then, and the World Road 
Association (referred to as PIARC based on its original French name) published guidelines on 
RSAs for new road projects in 2011 (World Road Association, 2011) and on safety inspection 
for existing roads in 2012 (World Road Association, 2012). With the exception of Japan, major 
countries have applied the practice, although the GOJ promotes RSAs through its bilateral and 
multilateral ODA to developing countries. This article attempts to conduct organizational 
analysis of the responsible national-level agency in road infrastructure—the MLIT—to identify 
factors why RSAs have not been applied and how they could be implemented effectively in 
Japan, especially from the organizational culture and absorptive capacity perspectives. The 
research is based on interviews conducted by the author with relevant government officials and 
stakeholders, in addition to a literature review and the author’s first-hand experience. 
Organizational culture is an important factor in organizational analysis (Smircich, 1983). 
Culture can be studied as an integral part of the adaptation process of organizations, and 
specific culture traits may be useful predictors of performance and effectiveness (Denison & 
Mishra, 1995). Organizational culture fosters innovation and imitation, and many factors have 
been shown to be determinants for supporting an innovative organizational orientation 
(Naranjo-Valencia, Jiménez-Jiménez, & Sanz-Valle, 2011). Each organization has a different 
culture, and Chatman and Jehn (1994) found that stable organizational culture dimensions 
existed across industries and that these culture dimensions varied more across industries than 
within them. The public sector and transport industry, characterized by long-linked 
technologies and low growth, were typically found to be detail and stability oriented rather than 
people and innovation oriented. 
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Cohen and Levinthal (1990) introduced the concept of absorptive capacity as the ability of an 
organization to recognize the value of new, external information, assimilate it, and apply it to 
its activities. It is critical to the organization’s innovative capabilities and is largely a function 
of the organization’s level of prior related knowledge. Zahra and George (2002) distinguished 
between the capabilities to acquire and assimilate knowledge (potential absorptive capacity) 
and the capabilities to transform and exploit this knowledge (realized absorptive capacity). 
Potential and realized absorptive capacities can differentially influence the creation and 
sustenance of the organization’s competitive advantage. Absorptive capacity is also dependent 
on the way organizations manage information inflow. Ishizuka (2005) pointed out that direct 
exposure of various individuals is a more effective means of absorbing external information as 
compared to the gatekeeping of information by a small number of individuals, particularly in a 
rapidly changing environment. 
The concepts of absorptive capacity and organizational culture are closely interlinked. 
Organizational culture in management formalization is one of the key determinants of 
absorptive capacity (Lane & Lubatkin, 1998). Higher levels of innovativeness in the 
organizational culture are associated with a greater capacity for adaptation and innovation. In 
addition, higher levels of innovativeness are associated with cultures that emphasize learning, 
development, and participative decision making. (Hurley & Hult, 1998). Organizational culture 
acts as a determinant of absorptive capacity to influence the implementation of new 
technologies (Harrington & Guimaraes, 2005). 
 Road Safety Audits 
 Definition and Benefits 
PIARC defined an RSA in its guidelines as: “a formal road safety examination of the road or 
traffic project, or any other type of project which affects road users, carried out by an 
independent, qualified auditor or team of auditors who reports on the project crash potential 
and safety performance for all kinds of road users” (World Road Association, 2011). The 
essential elements of this definition are that it is: (i) a formal process, (ii) an independent 
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process, (iii) carried out by someone with appropriate experience and training, and (iv) 
restricted to road safety issues. PIARC took the initiative to define pro-active procedures at the 
project design stage as RSAs and the on-site review of existing roads by driving and walking 
as road safety inspections (RSIs) as shown in Figure 3.1. However, the term RSA is often in 
practice used more broadly to refer to both RSAs and RSIs without the above distinction. This 
article will review both RSAs and RSIs in Japan. 
  
Source: World Road Association (2011). 
Figure 3.1: Concept of Road Safety Audit and Road Safety Inspection 
 
Various studies have reviewed the effectiveness of RSAs and concluded that they show strong 
benefits in proactively reducing accidents, thereby saving lives and decreasing damage. Wells 
(2000) assessed the benefits of the RSA program in the United Kingdom and found that making 
changes in the design phase resulted in considerable monetary benefits (€17,000 in average of 
22 projects). The Dutch National Road Safety Research Institute (2007) showed clear monetary 
benefits of RSAs. Due to the independent nature of the safety auditors, the RSA 
recommendations were noted as being helpful when the road developers or managers worked 
with stakeholders such as political leaders, road users, or road side residents. The RSA process 
looks at roads from a purely technical safety viewpoint without outside influences. 
 
Data feeds into road safety audit 
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 Application in Various Countries 
After their introduction in the United Kingdom in the late 1980s, RSAs were further developed 
in the United Kingdom, other European countries, Australia, and New Zealand. Following 
successful implementation in these countries, other countries have also applied RSAs, and 
international organizations like PIARC have promoted their use through guidelines and 
conferences (World Road Association, 2011). Multilateral and bilateral development agencies 
have noted the benefits of RSAs and promoted their use in developing countries. The World 
Bank has advocated RSAs for new construction and traffic management schemes (Gwilliam & 
Shalizi, 1996), and the Asian Development Bank (ADB) prepared an operational tool kit for 
RSAs to be used in its developing member countries (ADB, 2003). 
Many developed and developing countries have applied RSAs. According to the latest report 
by the World Health Organization (WHO), 147 out of 180 countries/areas worldwide require 
RSAs on new roads, and 138 countries/areas require RSIs on existing road infrastructure 
(WHO, 2015). Among Group of Twenty (G20) member countries, Japan, Mexico, and the 
United States are the only countries that have not applied RSAs, and India and the United States 
are the only countries that have not applied RSIs (Table 3.1). Only Japan and the United States 
have not applied RSAs among the ODA donor countries, or the 29 Development Assistance 
Committee member countries of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development. 
The U.S. federal government recently started promoting the use of RSAs. In 2014, the Federal 
Highway Administration (FHWA) of the Department of Transport announced in its website 
that the FHWA would “work with State and local jurisdictions and Tribal Governments to 
integrate RSAs into the project development process for new roads and intersections, and also 
encourages RSAs on existing roads and intersections” (FHWA, 2014). This leaves Japan as the 
only country among the major and development donor countries that has not applied RSAs in 
its domestic practice. 
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Table 3.1: Application of the Road Safety Audit Process by Major Countries 
Country 
G20 
member 
OECD-DAC  
member 
RSA for  
new roads 
RSI for 
existing roads 
Argentina X   Yes Yes 
Australia X X Yes Yes 
Austria   X Yes Yes 
Belgium   X Yes Yes 
Brazil X   Yes Yes 
Canada X X Yes Yes 
China X   Yes Yes 
Czech Republic   X Yes Yes 
Denmark   X Yes Yes 
European Union X X Yes Yes 
Finland   X Yes Yes 
France X X Yes Yes 
Germany X X Yes Yes 
Greece   X Yes Yes 
Iceland   X Yes Yes 
India X   Yes No 
Indonesia X   Yes Yes 
Ireland   X Yes Yes 
Italy X X Yes Yes 
Japan X X No Yes 
Korea   X Yes Yes 
Luxembourg   X Yes Yes 
Mexico X   No Yes 
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DAC = Development Assistance Committee, G20 = Group of Twenty, OECD = 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, RSA = road safety audit, RSI 
= road safety inspection. 
Note: Countries which belong to G20 and/or OECD-DAC are included in the table. 
Source: World Health Organization (2015). 
 Japan’s Response to Road Safety Audit 
 Official Development Assistance 
The GOJ has promoted RSAs in its bilateral and multilateral ODA projects and knowledge 
activities. Japan’s bilateral ODA is provided mainly through the Japan International 
New Zealand   X Yes Yes 
Norway   X Yes Yes 
Poland   X Yes Yes 
Portugal   X Yes Yes 
Russia X   Yes Yes 
Saudi Arabia X   Yes Yes 
Slovak Republic   X Yes Yes 
Slovenia   X Yes Yes 
South Africa X   Yes Yes 
South Korea X   Yes Yes 
Spain   X Yes Yes 
Sweden   X Yes Yes 
Switzerland   X Yes Yes 
The Netherlands   X Yes Yes 
Turkey X   Yes Yes 
United Kingdom X X Yes Yes 
United States X X No No 
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Cooperation Agency (JICA). JICA provided third-country training courses on “road safety 
engineering and management” in 2010–2015. The training, provided to senior government 
officials and engineers from nine countries (Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Viet Nam, Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand, and Timor-Leste), included the RSA process as one of the 
main components. JICA also provided similar third-country training on “road safety 
engineering and management for Africa” in 2015 to Botswana, the Democratic Republic of 
Congo, Ethiopia, Kenya, Malawi, Mozambique, Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia 
(JICA, 2016). 
The GOJ is the largest shareholder of the ADB, and the ADB president has been Japanese, as 
has been the largest number of international staff. The ADB introduced the RSA tool kit in 
2003 (ADB, 2003) and committed to mainstream RSAs in its road projects through the 
Sustainable Transport Initiative (ADB, 2010). The ADB further prepared a road safety action 
plan in 2012 and requested that RSAs be included in every phase of the project cycle including 
planning, design, construction, pre-opening, and operation and maintenance (ADB, 2012). The 
World Bank also promoted the use of RSAs in its projects and non-lending activities in various 
countries including Nigeria, Tanzania, China, Argentina, Republic of Yemen, and India (World 
Bank, 2014). 
 Application to Domestic Road Projects 
The GOJ’s various promotion efforts of RSAs through bilateral and multilateral ODA did not 
stem from and were not reflected in its domestic road projects. There has not been an RSA 
framework for Japan’s domestic road projects. Researchers in Japan have studied RSAs and 
provided policy recommendations since the 1990s. The Japan Society of Civil Engineers 
formed an RSA Working Group under its Standing Committee of Infrastructure Planning Study 
in 1997 (Nishimura, 2002). Imada et al. (1999) reviewed various aspects of the RSA process 
in other countries, studied Japan’s practices in road safety, and recommended a step-by-step 
approach toward the application of RSAs in Japan as: (i) a pilot project of RSIs on existing 
roads, (ii) the full application of a RSI program, (iii) a pilot project of RSAs on new roads, and 
(iv) the full application of an RSA program. In March 1999, the study also conducted a survey 
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of MLIT highway offices, municipal governments, traffic police departments, and consulting 
firms. The results showed only 6% (16 organizations out of the 287 that responded) were aware 
of the RSA approach and almost all the respondents neither knew what it was nor understood 
its benefits. It concluded that the dissemination of RSA methods and benefits was essential for 
the application of RSA practices in Japan. 
Some researchers reviewed transport planning practices in the United Kingdom and 
recommended the use of RSAs and NPM. Takahashi et al. (2003) recommended that Japan 
establish a new road management framework under which the mandates of respective 
organizations would be clearly defined and practices like RSAs could effectively function. 
They noted that Japan’s organizations did not have clearly defined mandates and lacked 
flexibility, and they called for reforms to the awareness of road management organizations. 
Takano, Takahashi, and Kato (2003) recommended that Japan learn from the United Kingdom 
and adopt RSA and NPM systems. Imada and Nam Gung (2000) proposed the use of computer 
systems to support RSAs through the review of the UK practice. The MLIT adopted the NPM 
system eventually as PMRA but not an RSA system (to be discussed further in the next section). 
The MLIT’s research agency, the National Institute for Land and Infrastructure Management 
(NILIM), studies new policy ideas before their actual application and often acts as the 
gatekeeper of incoming information for new technology. In the fiscal years 2001–2004, the 
road traffic department of the NILIM conducted a series of studies on methods leading toward 
the application of a RSA system in Japan. The studies reviewed situations in other countries 
and concluded that RSAs were effective for safety enhancement, cost reduction, and raising 
awareness. The NILIM recommended that the Road Bureau of the MLIT adopt a RSA system 
(Mori & Ikeda, 2003 and 2005). 
 Factors of Non-application of Road Safety Audits in Japan 
The GOJ has not applied RSAs in its domestic road projects, although this was recommended 
by the NILIM and various researchers. Although the WHO (2015) considered that RSIs on 
existing roads were conducted in Japan, RSIs in Japan are not regular or formal audits and are 
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limited to occasional inspections. In this section, the factors for non-application of RSAs in 
Japan’s domestic road projects will be reviewed. 
 Organizational Culture of the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and 
Tourism and Application of Performance Management of Road Administrations 
The Road Bureau of the MLIT is responsible for the overall development and management of 
roads within the GOJ and formulates policies in the road transport subsector. Based on 
interviews with MLIT officials 25 , the organizational culture of the Road Bureau can be 
characterized by top-down decision-making, closedness (i.e., lack of openness), mutuality, and 
sectionalism. Some pointed out that such organizational culture traits of the Road Bureau had 
been weakened after a serious of external criticisms on its closedness and mutuality through 
the processes of privatization of the former Japan Highway Public Corporation and three other 
expressway corporations completed in 200226 and reform of the road earmarked budget system 
completed in 2009.27 Yamada (1991) introduced that even strong organizational cultures can 
be weakened or changed when the environment surrounding the organization radically changes 
through an example of landline telephone services of AT&T in the United States. Such forced 
changes to the Road Bureau culture must have occurred as there was strong public criticism 
against the MLIT, the Road Bureau, expressway corporations, and their subsidiary corporations 
throughout the privatization process. 
It was also noted that the centralized, top-down characteristics often extend beyond the MLIT’s 
headquarters and into the national highway offices, expressway and toll road corporations, and 
municipal governments across the country in the field of road management. The hierarchy is 
said to converge to the Planning Division of the Road Bureau especially for technical issues 
(Figure 3.2). Such an organizational culture is a typical “Kasumigaseki Culture,” the GOJ’s 
                                                     
25  Based on interviews with MLIT officials from the Minister’s Secretariat, Road Bureau, Water and Disaster 
Management Bureau, and Ports and Harbors Bureau conducted on 24 January 2014, 20 February 2014, and 24 
April 2014 in MLIT headquarters in Tokyo.  
26  The process and other details of the privatization can be found in Yamagoshi (2006). 
27  Earmarked road budget was abolished from fiscal year 2009 based on a joint GOJ and ruling party agreement 
on 8 December 2008. Refer to MLIT (2017). 
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unique culture named after the location of the GOJ headquarter buildings and described by 
Nishio (2003). Kasumigaseki culture is characterized by closedness, privilege driven, 
sectionalism, centralization-fusion, and mutual dependency and is far from being a culture of 
individualism, where innovative ideas spring from individual choice and responsibility. It was 
noted in the interviews with MLIT officials28 that such Kasumigaseki culture traits were even 
stronger in the Road Bureau than in other comparable bureaus in charge of large infrastructure 
development such as the Water and Disaster Management Bureau and the Ports and Harbors 
Bureau within the MLIT. Some noted that Road Bureau is often said to have a military culture, 
where top officers’ orders have absolute powers. The MLIT, especially Road Bureau, was 
found to have strong traits of the group dimension and can be characterized as hierarchy and 
egalitarianism in Figure 1.1. 
  
                                                     
28  Based on interviews with MLIT officials from the Minister’s Secretariat, Road Bureau, Water and Disaster 
Management Bureau, and Ports and Harbors Bureau conducted on 24 January 2014, 20 February 2014, and 24 
April 2014 in MLIT headquarters in Tokyo. 
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Notes: As of Dec 2016, offices below division-level, unrelated to road safety 
and international affairs, were omitted. 
Source: Author, based on the MLIT website. 
Figure 3.2: Organizational Chart of the Road Bureau, the Ministry of Land, 
Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism 
 
It was also observed from the interviews that the Road Bureau had a strong gatekeeping culture 
in terms of information gathering and importation of new policy ideas.29 MLIT officials noted 
that information on international practices and ODA activities was handled in the International 
Affairs Office, and road safety issues were handled by the Road Safety Management Office 
and the Director for Road Safety Policy Analysis (Figure 3.2). Interview results showed that 
the Road Bureau was more oriented to domestic issues than to international affairs in terms of 
information gathering and dissemination compared to other ministries and bureaus within the 
MLIT, including the Water and Disaster Management Bureau, which hosted the World Water 
                                                     
29  Ibid. 
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Forum in 2003 in Kyoto and continues its active involvement in international events like World 
Water Day (MLIT, 2014a). 
Such organizational culture in information and knowledge sharing also descends to 96 national 
highway offices under MLIT’s 9 regional bureaus (including Hokkaido Regional Development 
Bureau), which cover all over the country and act as the frontline of the project implementation 
(Table 3.2). Takahashi, Okutani, and Aoyama (2003) examined knowledge sharing and 
management practice in MLIT’s local offices and pointed out the following characteristics and 
issues: (i) there is no sufficient incentive to introduce knowledge sharing mechanism through 
bottom-up approach from local offices, (ii) data and information are kept individually by staff 
members and not effectively shared within the organization, (iii) there is no incentive for 
changes and new ideas unless problems arise, and (iv) business style tend to be inflexible due 
to insufficient incentive for changes. These points also support the interview results that 
showed strong top-down decision making with gatekeeping information flow and not much 
incentive for bottom-up individual ideas. 
Table 3.2: National Highway Offices of the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, 
 Transport and Tourism 
Regional Bureaus National Highway Offices (1) Total 
Hokkaido (2) 
Sapporo, Hakodate, Otaru, Asahikawa, Muroran, Kushiro, 
Obihiro, Abashiri, Rumoi, Wakkanai 
10 
Tohoku  
Aomori, Iwate, Sanriku, Minami-sanriku, Sendai, Akita, 
Yuzawa, Noshiro, Yamagata, Sakata, Fukushima, Koriyama, 
Iwaki 
13 
Kanto 
Hitachi, Joso, Utsunomiya, Takasaki, Omiya, Kita-shuto, 
Chiba, Shuto, Tokyo, Sobu, Tokyo Outer Ring Road, 
Yokohama, Kawasaki, Kofu, Nagano 
15 
Hokuriku Takada, Uetsu, Niigata, Nagaoka, Toyama, Kanazawa 6 
Chubu 
Tajimi, Takayama, Numazu, Shizuoka, Hamamatsu, 
Nagoya, Aichi, Meishi, Mie, Hokusei, Kisei, Iida 
12 
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Kin-ki 
Fukui, Shiga, Kyoto, Fukuchiyama, Osaka, Naniwa, Hyogo, 
Hanshin, Toyooka, Himeji, Nara, Wakayama, Kinan 
13 
Chugoku 
Tottori, Kurayoshi, Matsue, Hamada, Okayama, Hiroshima, 
Fukuyama, Miyoshi, Yamaguchi 
9 
Shikoku 
Kagawa, Tokushima, Matsuyama, Ozu, Kochi, Nakamura, 
Tosa 
7 
Kyushu (3) 
Fukuoka, Kita-kyushu, Saga, Nagasaki, Kumamoto, 
Yatsushiro, Oita, Saeki, Miyazaki, Osumi, Kagoshima 
11 
Total  96 
Notes:  (1) As of April 2017, the offices without mandates for road management and 
development are omitted. Some of the offices also have mandates besides roads. 
The MLIT also has other local offices in charge of management and development 
of rivers, dams, sabo, ports, airports, etc. 
 (2) The bureau is named Hokkaido Regional Development Bureau and has slightly 
different organizational structure from the other regional bureaus. The local 
branches are called Development and Construction Departments. 
 (3) The offices in Okinawa are under the jurisdiction of Cabinet Office and not included 
in this table. 
Source: Author, based on the MLIT website (http:www.mlit.go.jp). 
As mentioned in the previous section, RSA and NPM systems were often recommended 
together by academia and MLIT’s research institute, NILIM, in the late 1990s and early 2000s 
as related good international practices. Through the gatekeeping manner of information 
gathering of the MLIT, NPM was well recognized by the Road Bureau, especially in the 
Planning Division, and was assimilated and exploited to from the MLIT’s realized absorptive 
capacity as PMRA (MLIT, 2016a). MLIT officials noted in interviews30 that a “champion” 
existed in the Planning Bureau, who studied abroad and promoted the PMRA and became 
considerably influential to get his ideas across the management and a wide range of staff. 
However, there was no such champion or momentum for RSA, and some officials noted that 
there might be some hesitancy within the Road Bureau as road safety matters always faces 
sectionalism “turf issue” with the National Police Agency. The PMRA involved all levels of 
                                                     
30  Based on interviews with MLIT officials from the Road Bureau conducted on 20 February 2014 and 24 April 
2014 in MLIT headquarters in Tokyo. 
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road organizations in a centralized top-down manner (Figure 3.3), which illustrates well-
adopted practices through the unique organizational culture of the MLIT, as the original NPM 
in the United Kingdom did not include such characteristics and was developed with 
decentralization of authority. Due to the limited capacity and interest in international affairs 
and closed gatekeeping, the full adoption of a PMRA system by the MLIT also left an RSA 
system unapplied, and the researches on RSAs remained as a potential absorptive capacity of 
the MLIT. Also, the MLIT’s organizational culture, where incentives for bottom-up policy 
changes are insufficient as Takahashi, Okutani, and Aoyama (2003) pointed out, made it 
difficult to create a ground for non-gatekeeping, bottom-up adoption of RSA system in Japan. 
 
Source: MLIT (2016a). 
Figure 3.3: Performance Management of Road Administrations in Japan 
 
Another factor that may explain why the Road Bureau did not adopt an RSA approach could 
be its strong culture of closedness and mutuality. RSAs delegate strong independent authority 
to external auditors. Such an approach would change the balance of the well-established 
hierarchical management system under which all relevant organizations were mutually and 
closely reliant. The officials involved in the pilot project in Chiba noted that there were 
concerns over the word “audit” because of the strong implication of external authority, and the 
Road Bureau 
National 
Highway Offices 
Regional 
Bureaus 
C
lo
se
r 
to
 p
ro
je
ct
 s
it
e
s - National-level policy planning 
- Reflection of evaluation to budget 
- Other matters 
- Road project planning reflecting regional needs 
- Effective and efficient budget allocation 
- Other matters 
- Road project management reflecting the local needs 
- Effective project implementation and prompt 
completion 
- Other matters 
58 
 
term used was eventually changed to “diagnosis” instead of “audit” in the nation-wide pilot 
program (to be discussed in the following sections).31 They also observed that avoidance of 
creating a new strong external authority must have been one of the factors explaining why the 
MLIT did not implement an RSA program. 
 Capacity in Road safety 
An RSA approach has proven to be effective and beneficial in reducing traffic accidents in 
many countries around the world; but how has Japan’s road safety capacity and performance 
been without an RSA system? Loo et al. (2005) conducted an analysis on road safety strategies 
in six administrations comprising Australia, California, United Kingdom, Japan, New Zealand, 
and Sweden. It examined nine components: (i) vision, (ii) objectives, (iii) targets, (iv) action 
plan, (v) evaluation and monitoring, (vi) research and development, (vii) quantitative 
modelling, (viii) institutional framework, and (ix) funding. It concluded that Japan performed 
worst in “evaluation and monitoring” mainly due to the absence of RSAs, but was good at 
formulating and implementing action plans.  
Japan enacted the Traffic Safety Policies Law in 1971 and implemented a series of five-year 
road safety plans. Thanks to these efforts, the traffic fatality has been declining since the 1990s 
(Figure 3.4). Japan has developed a unique and effective approach and implementation 
schemes in road safety enhancement, as is often observed in other fields (Suzuki, 2008; Shin, 
2014). However, as Loo et al. (2005) pointed out, the capacity could be further enhanced by 
applying an RSA approach and learning further from international good practices. 
                                                     
31  Based on interviews with managers and officials of Road Safety Division of Chiba National Highway Office 
on 3 September 2013 and 2 April 2014 in Chiba, Japan. 
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Source: National Police Agency. 
Figure 3.4: Road Traffic Accident Fatalities in Japan 
 
The MLIT also enhanced road safety capacity through a unique method with application of the 
PMRA. The method was used to identify the road sections which require priority 
countermeasures by analyzing the number of accidents per kilometer in each road segment. 
The information was actively disclosed graphically (Figure 3.5) to enhance public awareness 
and understanding. This approach contributed to drastic reductions of the number of accidents 
in many priority sections, resulting in reduction of accidents in 45 prefectures in 2006 
compared to the previous year (MLIT, 2007a). 
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Source: MLIT website. 
Figure 3.5: An Example of Road Safety Measures through New Public Management 
 
 Towards a Successful Application of a Road Safety Audit System in Japan 
 Pilot Project in Chiba, Japan 
Chiba Prefecture is in the Tokyo metropolitan area. Throughout the period 2000–2015, the 
traffic accident fatality rate in Chiba has been one of the four highest among 47 prefectures in 
Japan. The Chiba National Highway Office of the MLIT manages and develops major sections 
of the national highways in Chiba. In an attempt to enhancing traffic safety along the national 
highways, it started an RSA pilot project in 2013. No officials in the office except for the 
general manager knew about RSAs when the pilot project was proposed. The general manager 
had work experience with the ADB and initiated the pilot project based on his knowledge and 
experience. It was initiated as an RSI of existing roads on a section of about 20 km on the 
National Highway 126 (Figure 3.6). Four external auditors were selected comprising a traffic 
operations practitioner (TOP) and a traffic operations engineer (TOE), both certified by the 
Japan Society of Traffic Engineers (JSTE), and two university professors. The auditors 
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identified road safety risks especially at the two intersections (Sakatsuki and Miyata 
intersections) along the studied section of highway and made long- and short-term action 
recommendations (MLIT, 2014b and MLIT, 2015a). 
 
 Source: MLIT (2014b). 
Figure 3.6: Model Section of the Chiba Pilot Project 
 
The RSA of the pilot project was conducted through six steps: (i) desk analysis and field visit, 
(ii) analysis of risk factors, (iii) general approach of countermeasures, (iv) improvement of 
countermeasures, (v) design review, and (vi) evaluation of effects (Figure 3.7). The proposed 
countermeasures included intersection and road design change, road signage improvement, 
signal phase change, and removal of safety hazards such as disturbing billboards. Evaluation 
would be conducted after the countermeasures were in place to measure the effectiveness of 
the countermeasures mainly through vehicle behaviors (Table 3.3). Factors like surface 
conditions (dry/wet) and light conditions (day/night) should also be considered for the 
evaluation of changes before and after the countermeasures (Russo, Biancardo, & Dell'Acqua, 
2014). The general manager and the relevant Chiba Office staff noted that the team could easily 
conceptualize the benefits of an RSA and implemented the pilot project although no staff 
Location Map 
Sakatsuki Intersection 
Miyata Intersection 
Sakatsuki Intersection Miyata Intersection 
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member was aware of the RSA approach at the beginning. 32  The officials noted that the 
experiences of implementing road safety five-year plans and applying NPM had built up the 
capacity for the RSA pilot project as potential absorptive capacity of the MLIT organization. 
 
 Source: The author, based on MLIT (2014b). 
Figure 3.7: Auditing Process of the Chiba Pilot Project 
  
                                                     
32  Based on interviews with managers and officials of Road Safety Division of Chiba National Highway Office 
on 3 September 2013 and 2 April 2014 in Chiba, Japan. 
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Table 3.3: Evaluation Items for Countermeasures of the Chiba Pilot Project 
Category Tools Items to be measured of the changes 
Vehicle 
behavior 
Video surveillance of 
vehicles  
(i) lane changing position, (ii) stopping 
position, (iii) paths of bicycles, (iv) distance 
between cars, etc.  
Probe data (i)travel speed, (ii) sudden braking 
Speed gun survey Travel speed 
Intersections passing time 
survey 
Intersection passing time 
Braking frequency survey Braking frequency 
Driver behavior Eye-camera survey Attention points of drivers 
User and public 
perceptions 
Web-based questionnaire Users’ perceptions on safety, comfort, visibility, 
etc. 
Site questionnaire and 
interviews 
Perceptions of roadside residents and business 
owners 
Public comment Perceptions of public 
Traffic 
accidents 
Data from the Institute for 
Traffic Accident Research 
and Data Analysis 
(i) the total number of traffic accidents, (ii) 
traffic accidents by category, (iii) ratio of fatal 
accidents, etc. 
 Source: Author, based on information from Chiba Highway Office. 
The results of the pilot project were presented to the Chiba Prefecture Safety Enhancement 
Committee comprising various stakeholders including academia, NGOs, road users, traffic 
police, and road management organizations (MLIT, 2014b; MLIT, 2015a). The audit 
recommendations were prepared (Figure 3.8), but the countermeasures from the road manager 
had not been installed yet at the time of the committee. The committee members welcomed the 
pilot project results and noted the effectiveness of improving the safety of road infrastructure 
purely from a technical perspective and reducing any negative impacts of political interventions 
or sectionalism. They also noted that RSA approach would enhance adequate prioritization of 
safety enhancement measures and optimize allocation of limited resources available for safety 
enhancement. The committee recommended that the MLIT apply the safety audit to new roads 
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using the word “diagnosis” instead of “audit” until an RSA approach was officially adopted in 
Japan. 
 
Source: Author, based on the information from the Chiba National Highway Office. 
Figure 3.8: Recommended Countermeasures by the Safety Auditors  
(Sakatsuki Intersection Case) 
 
 Nation-wide Pilot Program 
The pilot project by the Chiba National Highway Office was reported to the Road Safety 
Management Office, Road Bureau at the headquarters of the MLIT. One of the senior staff in 
the office had work experience in a multilateral development organization, the World Bank. 
The staff, being strongly aware of the need for and benefits of RSAs, further promoted the use 
of RSAs and RSIs.33 The MLIT initiated a nation-wide pilot program in 2015 based on a 
proposal developed by the Road Safety Management Office. The program was offered to 
municipal governments and named “road safety diagnosis” (not “audit”) following internal 
                                                     
33  Based on interviews with MLIT officials on 24 April 2014 in the MLIT headquarters in Tokyo. 
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discussion in the Road Bureau (MLIT, 2015b). Some municipalities, such as Okayama City, 
started pilot projects based on this initiative (Figure 3.9), and the Road Bureau is further 
promoting the pilot program. 
 
Source: MLIT (2016b). 
Figure 3.9: Road Safety Diagnosis Pilot Project by Okayama City Government 
 
 Further Application and Absorptive Capacity of the Ministry of Land, 
Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism 
A pilot RSA project in Chiba progressed to a nation-wide pilot program and initial actions 
towards establishment of a nation-wide system. MLIT officials noted that the breakthrough 
was brought about by individual officials in the Chiba National Highway Office and the 
headquarters who had prior work experiences in multilateral development organizations.34 
Such a breakthrough was not made in the late 1990s and early 2000s when the NILIM, as an 
official gatekeeper of such information, reviewed and recommended application of an RSA 
system to the MLIT. This section reviews factors that led to successful introduction and initial 
application of RSAs and how they can be further promoted in domestic road projects in Japan. 
The MLIT’s organizational culture was characterized to have a strong group dimension such 
as hierarchy and egalitarianism and was difficult ground for individual innovations (Section 
                                                     
34  Based on interviews with MLIT Road Bureau officials on 12 February 2015 in MLIT headquarters in Tokyo. 
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3.4.1). However, such cultural traits were weakened through the processes of privatization of 
the expressway corporations and reform of road earmarked budget especially in the Road 
Bureau, creating a cultural ground where more individual innovations can be brought up. Since 
the late 1900s and early 2000s, when the gatekeeping information providers for the MLIT 
introduced the RSA approach and could not have it applied, the RSA approach had been 
gradually forgotten among MLIT officials. The recent breakthrough was brought about by a 
small number of individual staff members, who had direct exposure to ODA and other overseas 
projects.  
One of the most important factors for a successful RSA is to have the right team with 
appropriate expertise (Ram, 2013). The officials who led the Chiba pilot project noted that they 
consulted with NILIM and other road safety experts to select an appropriate team of experts 
and eventually utilized TOE and TOP experts certified by the JSTE in addition to academics 
and a consultant. They noted that the team functioned effectively, and the internal capacity, 
although not directly realized as absorptive capacity in managing RSAs, was sufficient.35 The 
officials in the MLIT headquarters noted that team composition and authority can be further 
developed through the nation-wide pilot program.36 
Once the top management commits to implementation of new policies, the MLIT’s centralized, 
top-down decision-making culture can function effectively to implement the policy and achieve 
broad coverage including some municipal governments. As noted earlier, the MLIT 
successfully adopted a NPM system as PMRA, initially imitating the practice from the United 
Kingdom and developing it into a unique system. MLIT officials noted in interviews that even 
though only a very small number of individuals in the Planning Division of the Road Bureau 
promoted PMRA quite strongly in the early 2000s, it led to nation-wide application, including 
some municipal governments, through a top-down manner in a relatively short period.37 Suzuki 
(2008) also pointed out that the GOJ’s bureaucracy could demonstrate strong operational 
                                                     
35  Based on interviews with MLIT Chiba National Highway Office officials on 3 September 2013 and 2 April 
2014 in Chiba, Japan. 
36  Based on interviews with MLIT officials on 24 April 2014 in the MLIT headquarters in Tokyo. 
37  Based on interviews with MLIT officials in Road Bureau on 20 February 2014 and 24 April 2014 in the MLIT 
headquarters in Tokyo. 
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capability once clear goals were set. It can clearly be observed that the MLIT’s Road Bureau 
has a typical GOJ bureaucracy in this regard. The organization can demonstrate tremendous 
absorptive capacity once the change—regardless of degree of innovativeness—is accepted as 
the organizational goal. Therefore, MLIT officials noted that an important factor for successful 
application of an RSA system should be its acceptance and full commitment by senior 
management based on further results of the ongoing nation-wide pilot programs.38 
The Chiba RSA pilot case showed that MLIT’s absorptive capacity acquired through Japan’s 
unique road safety implementation scheme, including the five-year plans and various road 
safety measures, had served as potential absorptive capacity when a pilot RSA project was 
introduced. Therefore, the potential absorptive capacity for an RSA program could be fully 
used if not only external auditors, but also the capacity of internal in-house staff, are well 
utilized in the design of the RSA system in Japan. Another key factor in absorptive capacity is 
diversity of knowledge. The pilot project in Chiba utilized external experts (TOE and TOP 
experts and academia) as well as internal capacity in developing the RSA framework. Further 
involvement of municipalities and traffic police in the nation-wide pilot program would further 
enhance such diversity and support more tailor-made development of an RSA program in Japan. 
In summary, the following were identified as enabling factors for flexible responses of the 
MLIT: 
(i) individual staff members’ bottom-up initiatives under MLIT’s organizational 
culture, where the strong group dimension (collectivism/hierarchy and 
egalitarianism) was weakened;  
(ii) potential absorptive capacity acquired through Japan’s unique road safety measures 
was utilized; and 
(iii) capacity of external experts was well utilized. 
 
                                                     
38  Ibid. 
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 Other Experiences by the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism 
This section reviews several two cases in which the MLIT responded to external requirements 
and expectations. These cases are analyzed mainly to verify the factors identified in the main 
case of the MLIT (Sections 3.1–3.5). 
 The Innovation Promotion Outline 
In October 2006, the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport (the English name changed 
to the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism with an establishment of Japan 
Tourism Agency in October 2008; hereafter collectively referred to as MLIT) organized an ad 
hoc “Innovation Promotion Task Force” headed by the administrative vice minister and 
including about 40 members at the director general level. It was a top-down attempt to promote 
innovation in various areas of the MLIT’s administration, reflecting the GOJ’s active 
promotion of innovation in the mid-2000s. In June 2006, the Council for Science and 
Technology Policy published the Innovation Creation Comprehensive Strategy (Council for 
Science and Technology Policy, 2006), and in July 2006, the Fiscal and Economic Integrated 
Reform Conference, created by a strong initiative by then Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi, 
published the Economic Growth Strategy Outline that emphasized the importance of 
innovation in infrastructure development, finance, technology, business management and other 
fields (Fiscal and Economic Integrated Reform Conference, 2006). In addition, the METI 
announced the Innovation Super Highway Vision in 2006 (METI, 2006). 
The MLIT’s task force collected 160 proposals on innovative measures in the relevant fields 
from 72 private firms. A mid-term report was prepared in February 2007, and the final report 
named “Innovation Promotion Outline in the fields of Land, Infrastructure, and Transport” was 
published in May 2007 (MLIT, 2007b). The Innovation Promotion Outline comprised the 
following six priority projects with their expected implementation schedule: 
(i) transforming the society to the place where necessary information is accessible 
for anyone regardless of the time and location, 
(ii) creation of advanced disaster prevention society, 
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(iii) maintenance of security and safety through advanced anti-terrorism technology, 
(iv) enhancement of efficiency and safety for logistics supply chains, 
(v) establishment of the worlds’ safest road traffic system by utilizing intelligent 
transport system technology, and 
(vi) introduction of a common integrated circuit (IC) ticket in East Asia.  
In terms of road safety (item (v), above), the schedule included the following targets for 2015: 
(a) pioneering the introduction of a support system for safe driving using vehicle-only 
(autonomous type), vehicle-road, and vehicle–vehicle communication technology, and (b) 
pioneering the adoption of on-board diagnostics by vehicle manufacturers. Such technical 
progress seems mostly on track with regard to the 2015 targets. 
In addition to promoting innovative technologies and their growth projections, the outline 
emphasized that the MLIT should create an organizational environment where innovations 
spring up one after another. It also noted that the MLIT should follow up on the progress of the 
policy measures included in the outline with a proper organizational framework. The outline 
also stated that the progress of the policy measures should be disclosed comprehensively to the 
public. The MLIT, with its large size and responsibility for administrating industries with 
enormous vested interests, tends to be a difficult ground for innovation, and the proposal in the 
outline would be a notable top-down attempt to change the organizational culture. According 
to the MLIT’s division staff responsible for the initiative39, the Innovation Promotion Task 
Force convened on 29 June 2007 and established five working groups to monitor the progress. 
The task force had follow-up meetings in 2008 and 2009, at which mainly discussed were the 
status updates reported by the working groups. However, no further follow-up meetings or 
actions have happened thereafter. Also, the follow-up status has not been reported to the public; 
even the working group status updates reported at the initial meetings in 2008 and 2009 have 
not been disclosed. Likewise, the outline and its contents were no longer acknowledged among 
MLIT staff members after a few years from its announcement.40 MLIT’s Policy Bureau noted 
                                                     
39  Based on interviews with staff from the Policy Bureau in January–February 2017 through telephone and emails. 
40  Based on interviews with 13 MLIT officials in January–December 2017. 
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there has been no clear impacts made by the outline in terms of the organizational culture, 
where innovations were intended to spring up one after another. 
Despite general progress in the relevant innovative technologies and the intent of the 
Innovation Promotion Outline, there is unfortunately no clear indication that the outline had an 
intended impact on the MLIT’s organizational culture to create an environment where 
innovations spring up one after another. However, the top-down message promoting innovation 
could have worked favorably to create an innovative organizational culture if MLIT 
management had continuously followed up on the outline. In August 2016, the GOJ established 
the Council for Science, Technology, and Innovation headed by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, 
adding “innovation” to the former Council for Science and Technology (Cabinet Office, 2016). 
Such top-down movements may gradually influence the organizational culture of the GOJ and 
MLIT. 
 Airport Management Reform 
The MLIT established the Airport Management Reform Promotion Office in April 2012 to 
enhance reforms in the airport business, specifically in the 28 airports that the MLIT was 
managing directly. The other 69 commercial airports in Japan, which were managed by airport 
companies (4 airports) or municipal governments (65 airports), were not included in the 
mandate of the reform office. The office was established in a rather unique setting to enhance 
innovation. Most of the members were external experts—the office started with 9 staff, of 
which 7 members (78%) were from the private sector, including fixed-term employees (a 
business consultant, a certified public accountant, and a lawyer) and secondees through public-
private exchanges from organizations such as an investment bank and a real estate and 
securities companies. The office had 12 members as of February 2017 and still maintains the 
high ratio of non-bureaucrats with 8 such members (67%) at that time.  
The externally-recruited staff noted about the unique MLIT organizational culture that “there 
is no clear sense of output targets,” “job descriptions for staff are very vague,” and “decision-
making takes a very long time” (Inoue, 2013). The office members took actions to improve the 
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culture by: (i) setting clear time-bound targets and (ii) changing to a flatter decision-making 
process. The members even changed the office layout to enhance internal communication: the 
MLIT offices usually have large rooms with desks clustered into groups (called “islands”), but 
the airport reform office turned the desks around to face the walls so that staff could sit closer 
together and communicate with one another more easily when necessary. Through discussions 
among the members, the office set the targets of (i) reaching agreements on the management 
integration of various facilities with at least two airports by March 2014 and (ii) initiating a 
concession to the private sector in one airport by March 2016 (Inoue, 2013). 
The office contributed to the adoption of “The Law on the Operation of the Country 
Management Airports Utilizing the Capacity of the Private Sector” in June 2013. This law 
would serve as the basis for the intended airport management reforms. As of February 2017, 
implementation policies had been prepared for two airports (Sendai Airport in April 2014 and 
Takamatsu Airport in July 2016), and the contract was signed for one airport (Sendai Airport 
in December 2015). A special purpose company started its operation in Sendai Airport in 
February 2016 for the terminal building and in July 2016 for other facilities based on the 
contract. Market sounding started for Fukuoka Airport in July 2016. According to the office, 
the next targets were several airports in Hokkaido (to be bundled together), Kumamoto Airport, 
and Hiroshima Airport. Most of the initial targets were successfully achieved.  
As pointed out by Inoue (2013) and confirmed by the current office staff41, contributing factors 
for the successful initial operations of the airport reforms are: (i) utilization of external experts 
and (ii) cultural change brought about by the external experts, who questioned drawbacks of 
the Kasumigaseki culture, and internal MLIT staff, who promoted the proposed changes. This 
can be noted as an example of innovation effectively enhanced through changes to 
organizational culture brought about by external experts. 
 
                                                     
41  Based on interviews with staff from the Airport Bureau in January–February 2017 through telephone. 
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 Findings and Discussions 
This section mainly reviews the adoption of RSAs in Japan from the perspectives of the 
organizational culture and absorptive capacity of the MLIT, in particular: (i) why did Japan not 
apply an RSA approach despite its worldwide application and Japan’s promotion of it in 
developing countries through bilateral and multilateral ODA initiatives, and (ii) how can Japan 
successfully implement an RSA system given its current success with pilot programs. Other 
experiences of the MLIT were also reviewed—namely, creation of the Innovation Promotion 
Outline in 2007 and establishment of the Airport Management Reform Promotion Office in 
2012. 
The Road Bureau of the MLIT turned out to have strong traits typical of Kasumigaseki culture, 
which include closedness, gatekeeping of information inflow, and centralized/top-down 
decision-making. It also had relatively smaller engagement with and interest in international 
affairs compared to other similar bureaus within the ministry. This organizational culture made 
the bureau devote itself to promoting NPM/PMRA, which had been recommended together 
with an RSA approach, had an independently positive impact on road safety, and resulted in 
the non-application of RSAs. However, the organizational culture had gradually changed to 
weaken its closedness and group dimension through the processes of privatization of the 
expressway corporations and reform of the road earmarked budget. A recent breakthrough with 
RSA pilot programs was brought about by the efforts of individual staff members, not by the 
gatekeepers of information inflow. In an organization like the MLIT and in areas of jurisdiction 
where substantial realized and potential absorptive capacity exist, innovative and effective 
responses to external requirements or expectations are possible with individually-led or 
bottom-up initiatives, not necessarily through gatekeepers of information, as observed in the 
cases of PMRA and the airport management reform office. Although large scale top-down 
attempts, such as the case of the Innovation Promotion Outline, may not provide effective 
innovation or breakthroughs in specific areas, such promotion may nonetheless contribute to 
changing the overall organizational culture, which is often associated with closedness and 
bureaucracy, the opposite of innovation, change, and creativity. 
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There are some positive factors that may contribute to the further implementation of an RSA 
approach following the recent emergence and success of pilot programs. First, the MLIT 
already has significant potential absorptive capacity with regard to such an approach. Although 
most staff members are unaware of the concept and methodologies of RSAs, and a framework 
of official auditing does not exist, past studies by the NILIM and other researchers are still 
valid and applicable in the current institutional setting and in road development and 
management practices. As the Chiba office demonstrated, the MLIT’s national highway offices 
should have sufficient potential capacity and expertise to coordinate an RSA system, and such 
in-house capacity should be utilized in addition to the development of external auditors. 
Therefore, past studies and potential in-house capacity should be further applied and enhanced 
based on the results of the ongoing pilot programs. Second, the MLIT’s organizational culture 
enables innovation from imitation, as was the case in NPM, where a unique PMRA system was 
developed including the road safety measures. The initial pilot program in Chiba Prefecture 
started as an imitation of ADB and other international practices. The program was gradually 
modified to fit the circumstances in Japan, such as using TOE and TOP experts and changing 
the terminology from “auditing” to “diagnosis.” Third, the broad influence of the MLIT’s 
centralized, top-down decision-making culture—which extends not only to the national 
highway offices, but also to some municipal governments—should quickly enhance the 
diversity of knowledge and experience through the nation-wide pilot program. As diversity 
enhances strong absorptive capacity, further involvement of municipal governments and other 
stakeholders should be another key factor in the successful implementation of an RSA system 
that fits the needs of Japan. 
Finally, it is recommended that the MLIT should promote breakthroughs by individual staff 
members and learning from international good practices in other policy areas to fully realize 
the potential of the changes occurring in its culture, i.e., reduced closedness and information 
gatekeeping. Such breakthroughs and learning would enhance the diversification of knowledge 
and the absorptive capacity of the organization. 
Several facts and observations about the reviewed cases were of interest from the 
organizational culture and absorptive capacity perspectives. Table 3.4 summarizes the 
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identified contributing factors for innovative and flexible responses to the external 
requirements and expectations in the cases of the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport 
and Tourism. 
Table 3.4: Identified Contributing Factors from the Cases  
of the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism 
Contributing Factors 
Case 4: 
Application of 
Road Safety 
Audits 
Case 5: 
Innovation 
Promotion 
Outline 
Case 6: Reform 
of Nationally 
Managed 
Airports 
Open and flexible organizational 
culture (weakening of the grid 
dimension) 
  + 
Individualized culture (weakening of 
the group dimension) 
+ - + 
Utilization of potential absorptive 
capacity 
+   
Utilization of realized absorptive 
capacity 
   
Utilization of external capacity +  + 
Note:  The mark “-“ indicates that no clear intended impacts were identified. In other words, it cannot be counted 
as a contributing factor despite its intention. 
Source: Author. 
 
Note 
Main contents of this chapter were published as: 
Nishimura, M. (2017). Application of Road Safety Audits in Japan—Organizational Culture 
and Absorptive Capacity Perspectives. Journal of Safety Studies, 3(1), 1-18. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.5296/jss.v3i1.10535 
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Chapter 4  
 
Conclusions and Policy Implications 
 
 Conclusions 
This dissertation provides an organizational analysis of two unique parts of the 
government of Japan (GOJ) through six case studies, three cases each from the Ministry 
of the Environment (MOE) and the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and 
Tourism (MLIT), focusing on unprecedented and innovative responses to external 
requirements and expectations from the perspectives of organizational culture and 
absorptive capacity. As introduced in Chapter 1, ambiguity remains in the studies of 
organizational culture and absorptive capacity, especially in public sector organizations 
(Zahra & George, 2002; Klarner, Probst, & Soparnot, 2008), and more research is 
required to show the influence of organizational design and individual-level factors 
(Volberda, Foss, & Lyles, 2010). The previous chapters provided concrete case studies 
of organizational culture and absorptive capacity in two public sector organizations in 
Japan. The case studies also examined organizational design and individual factors 
related to the relevant staff members. 
The findings from each case study can be summarized as in Table 4.1. In each case, the 
policy formulation processes were reviewed, and facts based on interviews, dialogues, 
and observations were recorded. Based on these facts, contributing factors were analyzed, 
and the conclusions were drawn mostly through abductive reasoning. 
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Table 4.1: Summary Findings from the Case Studies 
Cases 
Required/expected 
organizational responses 
Organizational culture and  
absorptive capacity findings 
1. Transport of 
radioactive soil 
and wastes to 
Fukushima ISF 
(Chapter 2, 
Sections 2.2, 2.3) 
The MOE was required to 
plan and implement 
unprecedented transport of 
large amounts of 
radioactive soil and waste 
to ISF. 
Organizational culture with friendliness 
and openness and flat decision-making 
enhanced utilization of secondees and 
other externally-recruited staff. The 
secondment arrangement with the MLIT 
worked favorably. 
Potential absorptive capacity from 
pollution-related diseases and realized 
absorptive capacity in PCB treatment 
and transport contributed positively. 
2. Formulation of 
the Basic 
Environment 
Law 
(Chapter 2,  
Section 2.4.1) 
The MOE was expected to 
create a new law to 
accommodate emerging 
environmental issues. 
Flexible staff management including the 
appointment of the director from the 
MOF and dual-appointments (“human 
hunting”) enhanced diverse absorptive 
capacity. 
The MOE overcame strong sectionalism 
present in the GOJ through political top-
down decisions and use of an external 
committee.  
3. Establishment of 
the Carbon Tax 
and responses to 
climate change 
(Chapter 2, 
Section 2.4.2) 
The MOE was expected to 
take measures on climate 
change, including the use 
of economic instruments as 
global concerns grew, 
especially after the 
adoption of the Kyoto 
Protocol. 
The MOE responded with flexibility and 
careful consideration of the priorities of 
other ministries and stakeholders. 
The Basic Environment Law provided a 
breakthrough, but establishment of the 
Carbon Tax took many more years. 
Absorptive capacity on energy-saving 
technologies grew gradually through the 
years through cooperation projects with 
other ministries. 
The secondment arrangement with the 
MOF worked favorably. 
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4. Adoption of 
RSAs 
(Chapter 3, 
Sections 3.2–3.5) 
The MLIT was expected to 
adopt RSAs as they are 
considered an international 
good practice and the GOJ 
is promoting their use to 
developing countries 
through ODA.  
The MLIT’s gatekeeping information 
flow enabled introduction of NPM as 
PMRA but not RSA.  
MLIT’s recent pilot programs resulted 
from individual-level breakthroughs, not 
from information gatekeepers. Strong 
potential absorptive capacity in road 
safety and the top-down decision-
making culture make for potentially 
smooth and quick adoption. 
5. Formulation of 
the Innovation 
Promotion 
Outline 
(Chapter 3,  
Section 3.6.1) 
The MLIT initiated the 
formulation of the outline 
in a top-down manner 
reflecting the GOJ’s strong 
interest in innovation. 
Inclusion of proposals from the public 
sector and the ministry-wide efforts 
progressed innovative technical 
development, but no clear effects on the 
intended innovative culture/environment 
creation were found. 
Top-down efforts are necessary, but 
bottom-up and individual-level 
approaches are more effective for the 
creation of innovative breakthroughs in 
an organization. 
6. Reform of the 
nationally 
managed 
airports 
(Chapter 3,  
Section 3.6.2) 
The MLIT was expected to 
reform management of its 
airports. 
Externally recruited specialists changed 
the organizational culture within the 
office and successfully achieved most of 
the initial targets. 
GOJ = government of Japan, ISF = interim storage facility, MLIT, = Ministry of Land, 
Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism, MOE = Ministry of the Environment, MOF = Ministry of 
Finance, NPM = new public management, ODA = official development assistance, PMRA = 
public management of road administrations, RSA = road safety audit. 
Source: Author. 
 
78 
 
The GOJ’s general organizational culture is known as “Kasumigaseki culture,” 
characterized by closedness, mutuality, and gatekeeping of information flow, and is not 
a suitable ground for innovation. However, the case studies showed that innovative 
responses to external requirements and expectations can be brought about through 
changes in the organizational culture, strong initiatives by individuals or small groups, 
and effective use of absorptive capacity. 
In terms of organizational culture, the openness and friendliness culture in the MOE, 
especially toward secondees and externally-recruited staff, benefitted the innovative and 
flexible responses to the unprecedented challenges caused by the Fukushima Dai-ichi 
nuclear accident. The MOE’s flat decision-making structure also enhanced quick and 
flexible responses. Flexible personnel management at the MOE was observed in the cases 
of the Fukushima Interim Storage Facility (ISF) and the Basic Environment Law, such 
as the appointment of secondees from other ministries in key positions and a “human-
hunt” of various internal staff to dual-appoint them to the new positions. Such flexible 
management and use of external staff contributed to the successful results. However, 
flexibility may not always lead to successful results. In the case of the Carbon Tax, some 
criticized the MOE for paying too much consideration to opposing other ministries and 
industries, and the resulting tax rate was criticized as being too low to create meaningful 
effects on greenhouse gas emissions. 
The MLIT’s administrative authority is one of the largest in the GOJ ministries. Its 
organizational culture was found to be stable and detail-oriented than people and 
innovation-oriented as Chatman and Jehn (1994) found in their study of the public sector 
and transport industries. A top-down attempt to promote an innovative environment 
within the ministry through the Innovation Promotion Outline did not create clear 
impacts on the culture. However, individual-level initiatives, as in the cases of road safety 
audits and the Airport Management Reform Promotion Office, brought about innovative 
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changes. Diversity of staff, including the use of external experts, such as the case of the 
airport management reform, appears to be an enabling factor for innovative responses. 
Absorptive capacity also played an important role in the responses of the ministries. The 
MOE effectively applied potential absorptive capacity from the management of 
pollution-related diseases and realized absorptive capacity from the treatment and 
transport of polychlorinated biphenyl to the planning and implementation of transport to 
the ISF. The MOE built up its absorptive capacity through cooperative projects in energy 
conservation technologies before the establishment of the Carbon Tax so that such 
capacity could be fully utilized in the projects funded with the revenues from the Carbon 
Tax. The MLIT utilized the potential and external capacities of in-house engineers in 
road safety enhancement and existing certified experts in lieu of road safety auditors, 
which did not exist in Japan. 
The contributing factors identified from the case studies are summarized as Table 4.2. 
The working hypotheses established in Section 1.2 are shown to be the best possible 
explanations for the observed innovative or flexible responses of the GOJ organizations 
through the case studies. The following conclusions are derived. 
(i) Weakening of the group and grid dimensions towards individualism 
(Figure 1.1) contributed innovative and flexible responses under the 
GOJ’s unique organizational culture. The cases 1, 2, and 6 showed 
weakening of the grid dimension is effective while the cases 1, 4, and 6 
showed weakening of the group dimension is effective. In the case 5, the 
MLIT intended to promote innovation with an enhanced group dimension, 
but the intended results were not achieved. 
(ii) When weakening of the group dimension enhanced exposure to external 
information by numerous individuals, instead of gatekeeping by a small 
number of designated individuals, the enhanced exposure contributed to 
innovative and flexible responses as shown in the case 4. 
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(iii) A full utilization of realized and potential absorptive capacity within 
organizations contributed to the effectiveness of organizational responses. 
The cases 1, 3, and 4 showed utilization of potential absorptive capacity 
effective while the case 1 showed utilization of realized absorptive 
capacity effective. 
(iv) Use of external capacity is necessary for the expertise that lacks within 
the organizations. In relation to the item (ii) above, lack of expertise 
within the GOJ organization should be complemented by external experts. 
Use of external experts sometimes changes the culture of the organization 
as well. 
Table 4.2: Identified Contributing Factors from the Case Studies 
Organization Ministry of the Environment 
Ministry of Land, 
Infrastructure, Transport and 
Tourism 
Cases 
Factors 
Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 4 Case 5 Case 6 
Open and flexible 
organizational culture 
(weakening of the grid 
dimension) 
+ +    + 
Individualized culture 
(weakening of the group 
dimension) 
+   + - + 
Utilization of potential 
absorptive capacity 
+  + +   
Utilization of realized 
absorptive capacity 
+      
Utilization of external 
capacity 
+ + + +  + 
Note:  The mark “-“ indicates that no clear intended impacts were identified. In other words, it cannot be 
counted as a contributing factor despite its intention. 
Source: Author. 
 Discussions and Policy Implications 
Organizational culture and absorptive capacity can be key factors in an organization’s 
responses to external requirements and expectations. As the culture of the GOJ is often 
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associated with closedness and mutuality, the promotion of a culture which enables more 
innovation should be considered for non-routine requirements and expectations where 
ordinary solutions are not likely to be relevant or effective. Such cultural change is not 
easy to bring in through a top-down manner, but creating a flat decision-making structure 
and diversifying information and knowledge management to enable more diverse 
exposure, instead of gatekeeping, can be examples of enabling factors. However, as 
innovations are often brought about by individuals or small groups, flexible personnel 
management including the use of external experts should be encouraged. Recently, more 
ministries have been recruiting mid-career experts, and this can be a factor promoting 
innovation and culture change. Absorptive capacity comprises potential and realized 
capacities. It is not easy to identify potential absorptive capacity and use it effectively, 
but it can be utilized through close communication within an open and friendly 
organizational culture, as observed in the case of transport to the ISF. 
Strong and stable cultures, even the notorious Kasumigaseki culture, can be beneficial to 
organizations in some tasks and mandates. However, such strength or stableness 
sometimes leads to stagnation and affect the organization’s performances by not flexibly 
adjusting to changing environments or emerging challenges. On the other hand, 
weakness in organizational culture sometimes leads to lack of internal integrity to 
effectively achieve organization’s tasks. It was observed in the case of MLIT’s RSA that 
Road Bureau’s strong cultural traits in closedness and group dimension were weakened 
through strong external criticisms in the processes of express corporations’ privatization 
and road earmarked budget reform. Yamada (1991) pointed out issues associated with 
strong and weak organizational cultures and importance of flexibly changing strong 
organizational culture through maintenance of organizational identity. In various case 
studies in this dissertation, utilization of external experts was identified as a contributing 
factor for innovative and flexible responses of the GOJ (Table 4.2). One may argue that 
ad hoc organizations like various Cabinet Office departments can be an ideal ground for 
such performances as they mostly comprise external secondees from various line 
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ministries. However, the author discusses that such organizations tend to have too weak 
organizational culture to form a solid identity to share the organizational common goals 
or operational directions throughout the organizations. In case of ISF, although the 
relevant staff are dominated by external experts, clear operational directions stemmed 
from the unprecedented challenge must have compensated for the weakened 
organizational culture. 
In summary, the following policy recommendations are proposed: (i) organizational 
culture and absorptive capacity should be considered as key factors in an organization’s 
responses to external requirements and expectations, (ii) enabling of cultural factors that 
support innovative responses to non-routine requirements and expectations (e.g., 
reducing closedness and mutuality; enhancing flat decision-making) should be promoted 
to GOJ organizations, and (iii) not only realized but also potential absorptive capacities 
should be considered to maximize organizational performance. 
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Note 
The English translations of the Japanese laws, organization names, and other proper 
nouns were taken from the English websites of respective ministries and organizations 
unless otherwise noted. 
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